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ABSTRACT 
Sergei Mironovich Kirov, a close associate of Joseph Stalin and Leningrad Party Chief in the 
period between 1926 and 1934 was shot to death in his headquarters in Leningrad on 1 
December 1934. Before the opening of the Soviet archives in the early 1990s, there was a 
prevailing theory that Stalin was in some way involved in the assassination of Kirov. It was 
suggested that Kirov was eliminated on Stalin‟s order as a potential political rival. There were 
prevalent assumptions among scholars and the public that, in cooperation with other regional 
secretaries, Kirov advanced an independent set of reforms aimed at relaxation of policies and 
reconciliation with Stalin‟s former rivals. Sergei Kirov was repeatedly portrayed as an 
independent politician who, despite his close relationship with Stalin, could oppose him on 
central political issues.  
This Master of Arts dissertation is aimed at examining the question of whether Kirov‟s 
political vision of the Soviet central policies was in any way different from the political 
programme advanced by Stalin and the rest of his inner circle in the late 1920s and early 
1930s. It also seeks to discuss whether Kirov was in any way more liberal in his treatment of 
various oppositional groups, and whether he faithfully supported the implementation of 
Stalin‟s policies in the Leningrad region, which was under Kirov‟s authority. The main 
approach to studying the research question is biographical. Due to the chosen genre of 
writing, the dissertation is structured chronologically as well as thematically. The discussion 
is primarily limited to the assessment of domestic policies. It has been decided to concentrate 
mainly on such issues as economic planning and the fate of oppositionists because these 
matters were central in the Party debates in the late 1920s and early 1930s.  
This research has been principally based on the examination of the accessible archival 
documentation preserved in the Russian State Archive for Social and Political History, 
RGASPI, in Moscow. It includes documentations from personal archives of Kirov and Stalin, 
and the archive of the Politburo, or policy-making body of the Soviet Union.      
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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
The transliterations from Russian to English in this dissertation will be based on a simplified 
version of the Romanisation of Russian presented by the US Library of Congress
1
, LOC.  
Cyrillic Alphabet LOC 
Romanisation 
Thesis 
Romanisation 
А A A 
Б B B 
В V V 
Г G G 
Д D D 
Е E E /Ye (initial position) 
Ё Ё Yo 
Ж ZH ZH 
З Z Z 
И I I 
Й I I 
К K K 
Л L L 
М M M 
Н N N 
О O O 
П P P 
Р R R 
С S S 
Т T T 
У U U 
Ф F F 
Х KH KH 
Ц TS TS 
Ч CH CH 
Ш SH SH 
Щ SHCH SHCH 
Ъ ‟‟ omitted 
Ы Y Y 
Ь „ omitted 
Э E E 
Ю IU iu/Yu (initial position) 
Я IA ia/Ya (initial position) 
 ИЙ final position II Y 
 ИЯ final position IIA IA 
 НЫЙ final position NYI NY 
 Notes on transliteration were partially borrowed from John Arch Getty and Oleg 
Naumov in The Road to Terror.
2
  
  
By and large, proper Russian names were directly transcribed from their Russian versions. For example, 
Александр will be transcribed as Aleksandr rather than Anglicised Alexander.  
                                                     
1
 http://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/romanization/russian.pdf (visited 29.01.2009, 14.47 local time). 
2
 J. Arch Getty and Oleg Naumov The Road to Terror, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999), 
xix. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
MYSTERIES AROUND KIROV‟S LIFE AND DEATH 
On 1 December 1934 Sergei Mironovich Kirov, the chief secretary of the Leningrad 
Communist Party Committee in the Soviet Union, was shot to death in his headquarters in 
Leningrad, known today as St. Petersburg. Kirov was one of the most well-liked Communist 
Party leaders, a close associate and a good friend of Joseph Stalin. Labelled as one of the 
greatest mysteries in the Soviet Union history, scholars and the public alike have been 
debating the underlying motives behind Kirov‟s assassination. Among the theories 
questioning Kirov‟s death was a prevalent assumption before the 1990s that he represented a 
political threat to Stalin‟s leadership. Kirov, in cooperation with other provincial secretaries of 
the Soviet Communist Party, allegedly advanced an independent political course aimed at the 
relaxation of Stalin‟s harsh policies of the late 1920s and early 1930s. Stalin was presumably 
felt threatened by Kirov‟s independent position and growing popularity within the Soviet 
leadership as well as the Soviet masses and therefore wished to eliminate a political rival for 
power.  
While some perceived Kirov as a charismatic leader of a “moderate” course, which the Soviet 
Communist Party officially pursued in 1933, others insisted that Kirov was Stalin‟s golden 
boy: his unconditional follower and an advocate of Stalin‟s oppressive policies. The overall 
aim of this research is to analyse whether Sergei Kirov actually advocated his own 
independent set of reforms in opposition to Stalin‟s programme, whether he adhered to a 
group of more moderated minded party members, if there was one, and whether he 
represented a political alternative to Stalin for Party‟s supreme leadership.   
KIROV’S LINE AND ITS ORIGINS 
Doubts about Kirov‟s unconditional support to Stalin were initiated by the foreign press as 
early as the middle of the 1930s.  Boris Nicolaevsky, a prominent Menshevik in exile in Paris 
wrote an article entitled „Letter of an Old Bolshevik‟, which he published anonymously in 
two parts in the Socialist Herald at the end of 1936 and in January 1937. In the article Kirov 
was exposed as an initiator of a “new line” of moderation and abolition of the administrative 
pressure, which was pursued under Stalin‟s leadership in the late 1920s.3 Nicolaevsky drew 
                                                     
3
 Boris Nicolaevsky, “The Letter of an Old Bolshevik”. In ed. J.D. Zagoria, Power and the Soviet Elite: The 
Letter of an Old Bolshevik and Other Essays. (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966), 32. 
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his conclusions on the basis of Kirov‟s allegedly ambivalent relation towards Stalin‟s policies. 
It was claimed that the implementation of Stalin‟s policies proceeded slower in the Leningrad 
region, which was under the authority of Kirov, in comparison with other regions in the 
Soviet Union. Unlike Stalin, Kirov was perceived as more liberal in his treatment of 
oppositionists. Supposedly, he had successfully opposed Stalin in the question of the 
execution of the oppositionist Martemian Riutin in September 1932. Kirov‟s involvement in 
the Riutin affair, as it was called later, was adopted by scholars as a central proof of his 
opposition to Stalin. On the other hand, Nicolaevsky did not seem to question Kirov‟s loyalty 
to the centrally determined Soviet policies, general line. He noted that Kirov was a “one 
hundred percent supporter of the general line.”4 Nicolaevsky in later years admitted that he 
acquired his information about Kirov from informal conversations with Nikolai Bukharin, 
Stalin‟s rival in the late 1920s. The limitations of the Nicolaevsky‟s articles as a historical 
source will be discussed in Chapter 5 of the thesis.  
Nikita Khrushchev, Stalin‟s successor, politically deployed Kirov‟s death in his de-
Stalinisation campaign in the late 1950s. In his speech at the Twentieth Party Congress, held 
in February 1956, Khrushchev indirectly suggested that Stalin could have been involved in 
Kirov‟s death. Thoughts about Kirov‟s moderate position and Stalin‟s participation in Kirov‟s 
death were further expressed in the memoirs of Old Bolsheviks, Bolsheviks before the 
October Revolution of 1917, and the émigrés and defectors from the Soviet Union. Those 
accounts inclined towards the idea that Kirov represented a political threat to Stalin due to his 
popular and independent position in the party.
5
 As a result they added even more obscurity to 
the Kirov‟s political reputation.  
Kirov‟s line has been characterised as “soft Stalinism”.6 It should be noted, however, that 
“moderate” domestic policies have been generally associated with the position of Nikolai 
Bukharin, who favoured a gradual transition to socialism in cooperation between the 
peasantry and the working class. Nonetheless, Kirov‟s so-called “moderate” position in the 
party was not Bukharinist in its nature. Stalin‟s policies of collectivisation and 
industrialisation provided presumably the core of Kirov‟s vision. However, he seemed to 
advocate slower tempos for implementation of Stalin‟s policies. Therefore it is not 
                                                     
4
 Boris Nicolaevsky, “The Letter of an Old Bolshevik”. In ed. J.D. Zagoria, Power and the Soviet Elite: The 
Letter of an Old Bolshevik and Other Essays. (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966), 31. 
5
Aleksandr Orlov, Secret History of Stalin’s Crimes. (London: Jarrolds, 1954). Anton Antonov-Ovseenko, The 
Time of Stalin. (New York: Harper and Row, 1981).  
6
 Oleg Khlevniuk, Stalin i Ordzhonikidze. Konflikty v Politburo v 1930-e gody. (Moscow 1993), 4.  
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questionable that Kirov was a Stalinist, but rather whether he represented more “moderate” 
tendencies.  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
There is a wide spectrum of sources that focus primarily on the circumstances around Kirov‟s 
death. Rumours and speculations around possible involvement of Stalin in Kirov‟s death have 
also contributed to scholarly interests in Kirov‟s life. Discussions of Kirov‟s political position 
in the early 1930s often occupy important parts of the narrative about the circumstances of his 
death. Moreover, books on the Soviet Party history and biographies of Stalin often include 
discussions of the nature of the relationship between Kirov and Stalin, and of Kirov‟s role in 
the Soviet politics in the 1930s.  
On the basis of Nicolaevsky‟s interpretation of events in the early 1930s and memoirs of the 
Soviet defectors, before the opening of the Soviet archives Western scholars seemed to agree 
that Kirov was one of the members of a liberal grouping that opposed Stalin‟s oppressive 
policies. For instance, on the basis of an account of a Soviet defector, Isaac Deutscher in his 
biography of Stalin suggested that Stalin‟s leadership was divided to two groups: the so-called 
“liberals”, presented by Kirov, Kliment Voroshilov, Yan Rudzutak and Aleksei Kalinin, and 
the “radicals”, typified by Viacheslav Molotov and Lazar Kaganovich, Stalin‟s closest 
associates.
7
 In 1968 the British historian Robert Conquest in his assessment of the origins, 
scale and implications of the Great Terror in the late 1930s concluded that Stalin set up 
Kirov‟s murder in order to destroy his rival, and the liberal policies he represented. According 
to Conquest, Kirov‟s murder was a part of Stalin‟s grand plan to suppress all possible 
opposition, which actually happened by the late 1930s.
8
 Roy Medvedev, a Soviet dissident 
historian, came to a similar conclusion in his first book Let History Judge which was 
published in English in 1972. Like Conquest he suggested that Kirov was removed from the 
political arena on the basis of his oppositional stance towards Stalin.
9
 In a supplementary 
book on Stalin and Stalinism, published in 1979, Medvedev implied that domestic issues in 
the Soviet Union were formed as a result of disagreements between two well defined groups: 
“moderates” and “extremists”, or, as it were described at the time, between “doves” and 
“hawks”. Kirov was suggested to be one of the members of a “moderate” faction by 
                                                     
7
 Isaac Deutscher, Stalin. A Political Biography. (London: Oxford University Press,1949), 354.  
8
 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror. (London: Macmillan, 1968),36-42. 
9
 Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 44. 
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Medvedev.
10
 On the other hand, in Adam Ulam‟s Stalin biography published in 1973 Ulam 
questioned rumours about Kirov‟s liberal position in the Soviet party.11  
Western scholars did not gain access to much of the unofficial documentation in the Soviet 
Union in the Cold War context. As a result, their interpretations were primarily based on the 
released statements during the Khrushchev period in the late 1950s and early 1960s, their 
personal perceptions of Stalin‟s regime, some memoirs of Stalin‟s contemporaries, accounts 
of the Soviet émigrés and defectors published mainly abroad, as well as the Soviet literature 
and feature literature. As a result of the limited access to the archival documentation,  existing 
speculations, rumours and theories provided that basis for evidence of Kirov‟s “moderate” 
position in the Soviet Communist Party.  
In the middle of the 1980s, the traditionalist perspective that Kirov represented an alternative 
political course in opposition to Stalin‟s was challenged by a general re-evaluation of Soviet 
history of the early 1930s. If earlier historians focused on actors as an explanatory factor of 
Stalin‟s regime, especially Stalin‟s malicious personality, the so-called revisionists, typically 
represented by the American historian J. Arch Getty, followed a structuralist approach in their 
interpretations of Stalin‟s period. Although in 1985 Getty‟s Origins of the Great Purges was 
primarily devoted to the causes of the political purges in the 1930s, Getty also included an 
appendix that questioned Kirov‟s “moderate” position in the Soviet Communist Party. Taking 
both the general context of the Soviet politics in the 1930s and the new approach into 
consideration, he questioned the reliability of previous accounts and denied the theory that 
Kirov could have represented any alternative views in the 1930s.
12
  
The traditionalist views about Kirov‟s political standing did not change despite the 
appearance of new interpretations of the revisionists. In 1989, Conquest published Stalin and 
the Kirov Murder, where he still suggested that Kirov resisted Stalin‟s administrative pressure 
and the killing of political opponents, and advocated more moderate reforms than Stalin.
13
 
Revisionists, on the other hand, were accused of being admirers of Stalin, whereas the 
traditionalist were criticised of oversimplifying Stalinism.  
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of the archives in 1991 
more doubts were raised regarding Kirov‟s alternative position within the Soviet leadership. 
                                                     
10
 Roy Medvedev, On Stalin and Stalinism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 94. 
11
 Adam Ulam, Stalin: the Man and his Era. (New York: Viking Press, 1973), 386. 
12
 John Arch Getty, Origins of the Great Purges. Paperback edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
First published 1985, 1987), 92-94. 
13
 Robert Conquest, Stalin and the Kirov Murder. (New York: Oxford Press, 1989), 29.  
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On the grounds of the extensive research of the available archival documentation, a new 
generation of Russian scholars argued that traditional theories about Kirov‟s “moderate” 
political views were historically inaccurate. Many of the earlier accounts and speculations 
were checked against the accessible primary documentation. For instance, the Russian 
historian Alla Kirilina, after thorough research of most of the archival documentation 
regarding Sergei Kirov, in 1993 concluded that Kirov did not lead a group of moderates and 
he did not represent a political threat to Stalin. She suggested that, over the years Kirov 
dutifully followed Stalin‟s line. 14  Kirilina based her conclusions on the investigation of 
Kirov‟s personal archive, as well as classified documents from the investigation committees 
that were set up at different times to examine the circumstances of Kirov‟s assassination. 
Although Kirilina‟s research represents an important source for the analysis of Kirov‟s 
political standing, it should be noted that her argumentation tends to be selective at times. 
In his systematic evaluation of the mechanism of policy-making in the early 1930s in the 
Soviet Union, another Russian scholar Oleg Khlevniuk in 1996 came to a similar conclusion 
to that of Kirilina. Similarly to Kirilina, Khlevniuk also implied in his evaluation of Kirov that 
he did not represent any independent set of reforms, rather that he was one of the most loyal 
representatives of Stalin‟s clique. 15  Khlevniuk‟s research was primarily based on the 
examination of Kirov‟s role at the Politburo meetings and other central meetings. Khlevniuk 
has also carried out research on the career of Sergo Ordzhonikidze, a close associate of Stalin 
and Kirov. Other publications of Khlevniuk, devoted to Ordzhonikidze‟s career for example, 
have broadened present investigation of Kirov‟s role in the politics and his relationship with 
other members of the Stalin circle.  
Amy Knight‟s Who Killed Kirov? published in 1999, represents one of the relatively recent 
research efforts on Kirov‟s life. Although one of Knight‟s main objectives was to evaluate 
Stalin‟s role in Kirov‟s murder, much of her book was devoted to Kirov‟s biography. Knight 
suggested that Kirov retained some of his moderation over the years. In her portrayal of Kirov 
Knight presented him in a rather appealing manner, the way Kirov was presented in many of 
the Soviet accounts. Although she did not directly conclude that Kirov could have been a 
political rival to Stalin, there is an impression that he showed certain hesitancy towards 
Stalin‟s policies. Knight‟s account focused primarily on Kirov as a person and a politician; 
                                                     
14
 Alla Kirilina, Rikoshet, ili skolko chelovek bylo ubito vystrelom v Smolnom. (St. Petersburg: Znanie, 1993). 
15
 Oleg Khlevniuk, Politburo. Mekhanizmy politicheskoi vlasti v 1930-e gody. (Moscow: Rosspen, 1996). In 
2009 Khlevniuk published a substantial revision of his book in English, which will be used in this MA 
dissertation. Oleg Khlevniuk, Master of the House. Stalin and his inner Circle. (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2009). 
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her narrative tended to lack more general political and social context in Soviet politics. In the 
end, Amy Knight seemed to support Conquest‟s thesis on Stalin‟s involvement in Kirov‟s 
murder due to Kirov‟s reformist political standing. 16  It should be noted that Knight‟s 
evaluation was by and large based on the research of Kirov‟s personal archive including 
narratives from scholars of the totalitarian school, such as Conquest and Richard Pipes, as 
well as many published accounts during the Soviet Union.   
One of the newest works of the assassination of Kirov was presented in Norwegian by my 
supervisor, Professor of history, Åsmund Egge.17 Egge‟s Kirov-Gåten (The Kirov Enigma), 
published in November 2009, was based primarily on similar sources as used in this 
dissertation. It should be noted that the present research has been carried out simultaneously 
with that of Egge. Similar to Getty, Kirilina and Khlevniuk, Egge questioned Kirov‟s 
alternative position within the Soviet Communist Party. Egge‟s book was focused on the 
murder of Kirov and those involved, whereas this dissertation will be devoted to Kirov‟s role 
in top Soviet politics rather than circumstances of his death. 
Matthew Lenoe‟s forthcoming book The Kirov Murder and Soviet History in the end of May 
in 2010 should be also mentioned in terms of recent research. In combination with 
interpretation of various Soviet investigation committees of the Kirov murder, Lenoe seems to 
include new documents, he acquired during his fellowship in Japan.
18
 Due to Lenoe‟s kind 
permission to refer to his upcoming work it may be noted that the first quarter of his book will 
be devoted to Kirov‟s political career. In his interpretation of Kirov‟s political role, Lenoe 
seems to incline that Kirov did not represent a “moderate” faction of the Soviet Communist 
Party. 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
Critical analysis of sources will provide the main research method in determining Kirov‟s 
political position. From 1991 scholars have gained access to many of the documents that 
earlier were classified. Most of Kirov‟s archival sources are preserved in Moscow in the 
Russian State Archive for Social and Political History (RGASPI, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi 
Arkhiv Sotsialno-Politicheskoi Istorii), the former Central Party Archive of the Institute of 
Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. With the exception of 
                                                     
16
 Amy Knight, Who Killed Kirov? The Kremlin’s Greatest Mystery. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1999). 
17
 Åsmund Egge, Kirov-Gåten. (Oslo: Unipub, 2009). 
18
 Matthew E. Lenoe, “Key to the Kirov Murder on the Shelves of Hokkaido University Library”, http://src-
home.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/pdf_seminar/20060317/lenoe.pdf visited 16.04.2010 , 12 April 2010, local time 12.37.  
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some of the documents from Stalin‟s personal archive that were under scanning it was not 
challenging to collect necessary relevant information in the RGASPI. The required 
information has been gathered from four trips to the archives. 
The collections of original material regarding Kirov in the RGASPI include various 
stenographic reports of his speeches and his personal corrections, some hand-written 
preparatory notes, and correspondence, both personal as well as formal. All of these 
documents have contributed to understanding of Kirov‟s political preferences, his motives and 
intentions. For instance, letters and telegrams were an important means of communication 
between the Communist Party members in the 1930s. Personal correspondence between the 
Party members, also available in the RGASPI, can reveal the real nature of the relationships 
within the Party leadership. It should be noted that personal letters were not entirely dedicated 
only to personal issues, such as the state of health, but also to certain political decisions and 
arguments. The main drawback is that letters and telegrams are fragmentary since the Party 
members mainly wrote to each other when one of them was holidaying.
19
 Therefore, they 
cannot provide the only basis for interpretation. It is noteworthy that there seems to be a gap 
in the correspondence between Stalin and Kirov. It is unclear whether some of the letters were 
removed. There is the view that Mamiia Orakhelashvili, Kirov‟s friend from the Caucasus, 
removed some of the letters sent between Stalin and Kirov after Kirov‟s death. However, it is 
not known which letters exactly had been withdrawn.
20
   
Most of the Kirov archival documents are microfilmed. It is possible to order originals of 
those documents that have been declassified only recently. Documents in the RGASPI are 
organised by collections, fond, (f.), then inventory, opis (op.), file, delo (d.) and pages, list (l.). 
The quality of the documents in the Kirov fond is quite varying, from relatively good quality 
to unreadable texts. The unreadable areas did not generally cause challenges for the outcome 
of the present interpretation.  
Since the RGASPI archive in Moscow contains one of the most profound collections of 
Kirov‟s documentation, it has therefore not been required to visit the Leningrad Party archive 
in St. Petersburg. The RGASPI has also preserved Kirov‟s documents that were donated by 
Kirov‟s flat, today a museum in Kirov‟s honour in St. Petersburg. Additionally, many of the 
classified files regarding Kirov‟s life that were retained in the Presidential archive, one of the 
privileged archives, have been recently transferred to the RGASPI. Although the archive does 
                                                     
19
 Oleg Khlevniuk, Master of the House. Stalin and his inner Circle, 2009, xxi. 
20
 A.Yakovlev, “O dekabrskoi tragedii” in Pravda Nr. 24, 28.01.1991, 1. 
CHAPTER 1 UNIVERSITY OF OSLO MARIA DIKOVA 
8 
 
not seem to cover all of the aspects of Kirov‟s activities in Leningrad, the official character of 
the documents has not however challenged the outcome of the research. In addition to the 
documents preserved in the RGASPI, Kirov‟s speeches were also published on a regular basis 
in the central newspaper Pravda and more importantly in the daily regional newspaper 
Leningradskaia Pravda. Additionally, there are several collections of Kirov‟s speeches 
although edited, that have been published over the years.  
It is noteworthy that there is also a set of archival documents regarding Kirov‟s death 
preserved in the Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii, RGANI, also in 
Moscow. These documents primarily stem from the investigation committees set at different 
times. There have been altogether seven commissions that have investigated Kirov‟s murder 
between 1956 and 2004 under Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin. 
Officially, researchers have been granted permission to access these documents in the 
RGANI. However, according to personal experience of my advisor Åsmund Egge, the reality 
is more complicated than that. Over the years many prominent Russian scholars have had an 
opportunity to look through the fifty-eight volumes of the Kirov case in the RGANI. As a 
result certain documentation can be found in the secondary literature, such as in the analyses 
of Alla Kirilina and Oleg Khlevniuk, articles of Yakovlev, a leader of the Gorbachev 
investigation committee, and others who have had access to the documents.  
As well as documents from the Kirov archive, collections of documents of Kirov‟s close 
associates, such as Stalin, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, Viacheslav Molotov and Nikolai Bukharin, 
are also available in the RGASPI. Some of the required documents have been published in 
various collections of first-hand documents either in English or Russian. As for the official 
documents, the stenographic reports of the central as well as local meetings of the highest 
party and state authorities, and their decisions, are available from the pre-war years in the 
RGASPI. They have revealed Kirov‟s as well as Stalin‟s role in crucial political matters in the 
1930s.  
The Politburo archive is of utmost importance in the assessment of Kirov‟s role in Soviet 
politics, since the Politburo was the main policy-making body in the Soviet Union. Kirov 
officially joined the Politburo in 1930. From the early 1920s until the collapse of the Soviet 
system in 1991 the Politburo was the supreme agency of state power. It approved all 
important and many minor decisions by party, state and many other bodies. The protocols of 
Politburo meetings were sent only to members of the party Central Committee, and had to be 
returned by them within three days. Other officials merely received extracts, vypiski, from the 
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reports including those decisions which affected them directly. Particularly secret decisions 
were recorded separately and classified as a special file, osobaia papka. The special files were 
not sent even to members of the Central Committee. Instead extracts containing individual 
decisions were communicated only to those few persons who needed to know.
21
 Many of the 
special files are still unavailable for the public. Nevertheless, in 2007 some of the important 
Politburo meetings on the central cases from the period 1923 to 1938 were published in three 
volumes as a collection of stenographic reports.
22
 Otherwise, since the year 2000, much of the 
earlier unavailable documentation from the 1920s and 1930s has been newly published in a 
collection of essays, for instance, The Lost Politburo Transcripts, in 2008.
23
    
Besides a few brief personal notes on his biography that were supposed to be published in the 
Soviet Union, there is no autobiography or memoirs left by Kirov. Nonetheless, there are 
existing memoirs of other key party members close to both Stalin and Kirov, such as 
Molotov, Mikoyan and Khrushchev. Their recollections present insightful information about 
the perception of Kirov by his peers, as well as a presentation of general political matters.  
It should be noted that it was not common to write memoirs during the Soviet time. One of 
the researchers suggested that, „The reason for this [not writing memoirs or autobiographies] 
was a parallel belief in the paramount importance of the Party [...] as opposed to the 
individual.‟24 Whatever the reasons, most of the existing memoirs of the Communist key 
figures were written in the later years of the Soviet Union‟s existence. The relation of reality 
and text is one of the most central problems within using memoirs as historical sources. First 
and foremost, memory is quite selective. Also, the authors of the recollections were central 
figures in the Soviet history, even to a certain degree idols. Therefore self-representation and 
a good measure of whitewashing the self could be an important factor in writing memoirs. For 
instance, Molotov, one of Stalin‟s closest associates, presented himself to his last days as the 
loyal Stalinist in his conversations with Felix Chuev, despite all the negative experiences 
during the later part of the Stalin-era. Another challenge is that many of the assumptions 
central in the theory that Kirov presented a moderate course in the Party have been based on 
very often oral recollections of people who did not leave written accounts of their stories. 
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These speculations will be considered in light of a relative context as a way of interpreting an 
event.  
SPEECHES AND INTERPRETATION 
Kirov‟s speeches and official statements at the local as well as central meetings provide the 
basis for answering the main question of whether Kirov represented a “moderate” opposition 
to Stalin‟s main policies. There are scholars, such as Amy Knight and, Roy Medvedev who 
claimed that there were certain signs of moderation in Kirov‟s official statements in 
comparison with other Stalinists. There are, however, certain challenges in interpretation of 
Kirov‟s statements as well as speeches of other Communists.  
One of the major challenges in the interpretation of the sources is due to the ideological 
implications of the language used by the Communists. It would be oversimplifying to assume 
that the statements alone may provide the only objective answer to the actual political point of 
view. Rhetoric played a significant role in the formation of the Bolshevik dominant ideology 
and the social order since the October Revolution of 1917. Bolshevik reality was deliberately 
created and maintained from above. In general the statements of the Soviet officials were 
produced and written with great care and were intended to provide rules and parameters for 
political and social behaviour. Additionally, the texts were carefully edited, reflecting 
prescribed linguistic formulations and agreed upon slogans and phrases.
25
 Therefore the 
language played a normative function. Also, due to the policy of democratic centralism, 
already present during the regime of Vladimir Lenin, the party members were obliged to 
reflect central decisions in their official statements. The principles of the democratic 
centralism allowed free and open discussion until a decision was adopted. Thereafter it was 
the duty of all party members to defend publicly and support the general line, the adopted 
policy of the Bolshevik party. Therefore, controlled by the censorship, external as well as 
personal Stalinist rhetoric was in many ways hegemonic and claimed to be monopolistic. 
Besides, official texts did not tolerate competing discourse. Deviation from the party line was 
even a state crime: anti-Soviet agitation.
26
 The question is, however, if controlled by the state 
how the narrative can then provide the answer to the overall research question of the present 
dissertation. 
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Although the discourse was centrally controlled and checked, it would be an 
oversimplification to suggest that there was no place for linguistic manoeuvre. Language use 
could provide some unintended results, or so-called ideological slips. Besides, the Stalinist 
rhetoric was attributive rather than strictly definitional.
27
 The text should be considered in its 
practical context and against its author in order to establish its meaning. I would claim that the 
context of political factors determines the meaning of the given text and may provide the 
framework for interpretation. Some of the documents were meant for the public, whereas 
others were intended for the use of the Soviet elite secretly. Therefore the context is central to 
the interpretation of utterances of an agent of speaking or writing.  
It seems that published accounts of local party meeting tend to be less heavily censored.
 
Since 
they were intended for party audiences, matters were sometimes discussed relatively openly. 
Such accounts are of the utmost importance for this Master dissertation research question. A 
majority of Kirov‟s speeches from the local meetings in Leningrad therefore provide some 
important information about his political preferences. Additionally, Kirov made corrections of 
his speeches before their publishing. Those corrections are available at the RGASPI. 
Moreover, comparisons of Kirov‟s speeches and expressions with other top Communist 
leaders may provide a better understanding of Kirov‟s political life as well as the political 
situation in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. Such comparison can demonstrate the existence of 
similarities or differences in ideological thinking. Both contradictions and extreme similarities 
may provoke suspicions about the objectivity of the source. 
WRITING A BIOGRAPHY 
The research on Kirov‟s political position in the 1930s is often connected to possible motives 
behind his murder. However, there is still a need for a full-scale study of Kirov‟s political 
career in order to understand his political vision. The biographical approach provides a 
researcher with the best opportunity to study an individuals‟ development over time. In this 
case, a biographical genre provides a better understanding of Kirov as a politician. Kirov 
himself noticed that, „those of us who belong to the older generation are still influenced up to 
ninety percent by the baggage which we acquired during the old underground years‟.28 
Therefore in order to understand what kind of politician Kirov was it is necessary to estimate 
his whole career and to learn how he rose to the top of the Stalin political system. 
                                                     
27
 John Arch Getty and Oleg Naumov, The Road to Terror, 1999, 21. 
28
 S.M. Kirov, Izbrannye stati i rechi. (Moscow, 1939), 694. Also used in John Biggart, “Kirov before the 
Revolution” in Soviet Studies, volume 23, Nr.3, 1972, 348. 
CHAPTER 1 UNIVERSITY OF OSLO MARIA DIKOVA 
12 
 
Additionally, it is easier to include other explanatory factors, such as general political context 
and influence of the surroundings and circumstances.  
On the whole, a biography may be defined as a written account of a person‟s life in a given 
period of time.
29
 There are biographies written as chronological narrations that describe a 
person‟s life from cradle to grave and there are thematic biographies that concentrate on 
central and significant events in the life of an individual.
30
 I have chosen to write a political 
biography where the focus will be on Kirov as a political figure. Thematic biographies like 
this are supposed to provide a better understanding of events in a more general sense.
31
 
Kirov‟s case individually may provide an overall picture of the Soviet politics in the 1930s 
and its mechanisms. It may also demonstrate the relationship between the Communists on the 
top level of the Bolshevik Party. Nevertheless, it is quite difficult to ignore Kirov‟s personal 
life, since it may provide some answers to the motives behind some of his actions. In order to 
understand Kirov‟s life adequately a researcher needs to take into account other facets that 
shaped his work: his motives, drives and contexts which made him up as a political leader. On 
the one hand, the main focus is Kirov‟s political biography, while at the same time it is 
necessary to recognise the reality of social and political context and interpret Kirov‟s political 
life within the framework of social connections and networks.
32
 
There are several reasons for why historians tend to choose a biographical approach as the 
main genre for their research. The object for investigation may be a typical representation of 
the society in which he lived. His personality and life may be a reflection of that society.
 33
 
Another reason may be an individual‟s profound influence on his contemporary environment. 
An individual‟s life may be interesting merely because of his connections with the 
surrounding society and a biography is one way of understanding the more general picture.
34
 
The last reason seems to be representative for this MA dissertation. By focusing upon Kirov‟s 
role in Soviet politics, the whole political context can be made clearer. Kirov was a man of his 
time and therefore, indirectly, his political biography may provide a better understanding of 
being a Communist of the top elite, in addition to the work of the Communists on the local 
level. Kirov‟s life is representative of the Soviet nomenklatura, the Soviet Communist elite. 
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One of the major challenges of writing a biography lies within the fact that the presentation of 
an individual may depend on the author‟s personal interpretations and his or her own 
background. It should be noted that before the beginning of the research the author of this 
dissertation was influenced by a common assumption among the Russian population that 
Sergei Kirov represented a popular political alternative to Stalin.  
FOCUS OF THE RESEARCH AND STRUCTURE 
Kirov‟s death ultimately led to repressions of all real and imagined opposition groups and 
resulted in the greatest political purge in Soviet Union history, often referred to as the Great 
Terror. The Soviet police and the Soviet administration with Stalin at its head accused Stalin‟s 
former oppositionists in cooperation with Leonid Nikolaev, a disturbed party member who 
shot Kirov. The disastrous results of Kirov‟s death, in combination with sparse information 
about the circumstances of his death, which also seemed somewhat suspicious, have led to 
speculations about the motives behind Kirov‟s assassination. The first rumours about Stalin‟s 
involvement in Kirov‟s murder appeared already in the first days after Kirov‟s death in 1934. 
People were secretly singing, “Gherkins are green, tomatoes are red, / Stalin in a corridor shot 
Kirov dead”. 35  It is still controversial today whether Kirov‟s death was a result of an 
individual act of an unstable and dissatisfied man, Leonid Nikolaev, or whether it was part of 
a larger conspiracy involving the secret police Narodny Kommissariat Vnutrennikh Del, 
(NKVD), and Stalin. Nevertheless, the main focus of this dissertation will be devoted to 
Kirov‟s political position in the Soviet politics rather than the circumstances of his death. This 
MA dissertation is not an attempt to clarify the circumstances of Kirov‟s death but rather to 
analyse his political background. The discussion has been narrowed to focus on Kirov‟s work 
in Leningrad between 1926 and 1934 which proceeded during the early years of the Stalinist 
regime.  
The analysis will be primarily limited to the domestic politics of the Soviet Union. It has been 
decided to concentrate mainly on such issues as economic planning and the fate of 
oppositionists because these matters were central in the Party debates in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s. Due to the biographical approach, this dissertation is structured chronologically 
in its main parts as well as thematically in its subsections. The second chapter is devoted to 
the Kirov‟s political background before his appointment as the leader of the Leningrad Party 
Committee in 1926. It focuses on Kirov‟s pre-revolutionary activities, his motives behind 
                                                     
35
 Translated as in Donald Rayfield, Stalin and his Hangmen. The Tyrant and Those who Killed for Him. 
(UK: Penguin, 2004), 247. 
CHAPTER 1 UNIVERSITY OF OSLO MARIA DIKOVA 
14 
 
becoming a Bolshevik, his role during the October Revolution of 1917 and his acquaintance 
with Stalin. Chapter Three discusses Kirov‟s role in the campaign against Stalin‟s political 
rivals, Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, in Leningrad during the period between 1926 and 
1929. Chapter Four examines Kirov‟s position towards the First Five Year Plan, policies of 
collectivisation and industrialisation, and the campaign against the Right Deviation, presented 
by Nikolai Bukharin. Additionally, the chapter includes the assessment of collectivisation and 
industrialisation of the Leningrad region from 1929 to 1932. It seeks to investigate whether 
the central policies were implemented in different ways than in other regions. Chapter Five 
discusses theories and speculations around Kirov‟s presumably independent position in the 
early 1930s and possible political conflicts between Kirov and Stalin in the period between 
1930 and 1934.  
  
Since his death in December 1934, Kirov has been portrayed principally in an agreeable 
manner in the official sources in the Soviet Union. In the local Leningrad newspaper 
Leningradskaia Pravda, there are a great amount of articles devoted to the recollections of the 
Leningrad workers, and Kirov‟s colleagues and friends. In those articles, and later in his 
biographies, Kirov had been portrayed in a very likeable manner: as a favourite of the masses, 
and a dedicated Bolshevik. Recollections of different contemporaries also presented Kirov in 
an appealing way: “Kirov was loved and respected for his tireless ability to work, and 
devotion to party‟s principles, for his simplicity and warmth in communication.”36 Another 
recollection characterised Kirov in the following way, “He was able to treat equally any man, 
and he could find a way to any heart. I want to be like Kirov.”37 Since 1934, streets, theatres, 
plants and factories were named in honour of Kirov all around the Soviet Union. The city 
Vyatka in the Kirov region was renamed as the Kirov city some days after his death.  
Moreover, Kirov‟s life story was supposed to set an example for the Soviet children in the 
biographical book The Boy from Urzhum. Even today when many of the streets in Russia are 
being renamed back to their pre-revolutionary names, due to the break off with the 
Communist past, the Kirov streets seem to preserve their names. Primarily positive 
characterisations throughout the decades may explain why Kirov was singled out as a possible 
antagonist to Stalin. However, the theory that Kirov represented a coherent resistance to 
Stalin in the 1930s must be checked against the newly-available internal documentation from 
the Soviet Communist Party.   
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CHAPTER 2: BECOMING A BOLSHEVIK 
SERGEI KIROV‟S POLITICAL CAREER BEFORE 1926 
INTRODUCTION 
Sergei Kirov‟s pre-revolutionary experiences have been causing discussions about the nature 
of his Bolshevism prior to the October Revolution of 1917. In 1929, Kirov was accused of the 
vacillation between different revolutionary movements before choosing the Bolshevik line in 
1917. Due to the so-called “party purity” and the length of the “party service” being very 
important for the Bolshevik reputation, those accusations represented a serious matter against 
Kirov as a Bolshevik. Was Kirov a staunch Bolshevik from the start or did he doubt his 
political preferences? Such a background will clarify what kind of politician Kirov was before 
his appointment as a Party Chief of Leningrad in 1926.  
POLITICAL AWAKENINGS 
Sergei Mironovich Kirov was born under the surname Kostrikov in March 1886. Like many 
other revolutionaries, Kostrikov adopted his pseudonym Kirov during his years of 
underground political activities. Kirov was born into a petty bourgeois family in Urzhum, a 
typical merchant town in the Vyatka region, which is the Kirov region today. From early on 
Kirov‟s life was full of hardship and sorrow. At an early age he lost both of his parents: his 
father left the family when Kirov was young, whereas his mother died of tuberculosis before 
he turned eight. Unable to take care of the three children Kirov and his two sisters, Kirov‟s 
eighty year old grandmother had to place Sergei in the Urzhum Children‟s Home, dom 
prizreniia. At the orphanage school Kirov occurred as a devoted, talented and hard-working 
student.
38
  
Urzhum occupied a special place in Kirov‟s early political education. Due to its remote 
placement the town had been used as a place for political exiles by the tsars. Apparently 
Kirov was in contact with numerous political exiles during summer vacations at his 
grandmother‟s house. According to Kirov‟s autobiographical account preserved in the 
RGASPI, acquaintances with exiles provided Kirov with an opportunity to attend 
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underground discussion clubs where he obtained illegal literature.
39
 Additionally, the contacts 
with the exiles in Urzhum led to interactions with radical students in Kazan, where in 1901 
Kirov studied mechanical engineering.  
With its university, Kazan was an important cultural centre. While studying in Kazan Kirov 
became involved in student underground clubs and read illegal literature. It is unclear what 
kind of political preferences Kirov had in Kazan, but he himself claimed in his later 
autobiography that already then he had adhered to Social Democrats.
40
 Due to the narrow 
amount of sources around Kirov‟s early years it is hard to assess the reliability of that 
statement. While reading Bolshevik autobiographies, it should be kept in mind that the length 
of the political service was very important for them. In later years the Bolsheviks tried to 
prove that their period of political commitment to Bolshevism was longer than it actually 
was.
41
 At the same time the Bolsheviks were quite strict about lying about their political 
service. Regardless of Kirov‟s political preferences in Kazan, his actual revolutionary career 
began in Tomsk, Siberia, where he intended to proceed with higher education.  
In 1904, Kirov officially joined the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDRP), which 
existed since 1898. The RSDRP was popular among the youth and workers. As a RSDRP 
member, Kirov enthusiastically participated in demonstrations and May meetings. His 
responsibilities included propaganda printing, distribution of illegal literature and agitation 
among the workers.
 
Furthermore, he helped to set up and operate an underground printing 
press for Party Literature, for which he got arrested in later years.
42
 As a result of the active 
involvement in the underground activities of the RSDRP, Kirov‟s education plans were 
delayed. 
It is noteworthy that by the time Kirov became a member of the RSDRP certain changes took 
place in the leadership of the party. In 1903, the leadership of the RSDRP split into two 
factions: the Bolsheviks, the “majority”; and the Mensheviks, the “minority”. The Bolsheviks 
led by Vladimir Lenin projected the overthrow of the monarchy that would be followed by 
provisional revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. On the 
other hand, the Mensheviks suggested that Russia should undergo a bourgeois revolution and 
complete her development of a capitalist economy before transition to socialism.
43
 Despite the 
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split in the leadership, there were only minor changes in the regional party committees. 
Bolsheviks and Mensheviks coexisted more or less peacefully on the regional level even after 
the official split. The Tomsk RSDRP committee, where Kirov was a member, was dominated 
by the Mensheviks. Even so, associations with the more leftist members of the Tomsk 
RSDRP Committee and Kirov‟s membership in the fighting squads, druzhina, placed him 
within the Bolshevik faction rather than the Menshevik one.
44
 All in all it is rather unclear 
whether Kirov felt pressure to choose between the two factions at that time. Kirov‟s role in 
the 1905 uprising under the leadership of the Socialist Revolutionaries and Social Democrats 
against the existing regime seems to be exaggerated by the Soviet biographers, who claimed 
that there was no more energetic member than Kirov within the Tomsk underground 
organisation.
45
 Kirov was arrested during the events of 1905, but he did not seem to play any 
leading role in the political matters of the Tomsk RSDRP Committee rather than usual 
responsibilities of a party member.
46
  
A REVOLUTIONARY OR A JOURNALIST?  
Kirov‟s revolutionary activities in Tomsk came to an end with his third arrest in 1906 for 
running of an illegal underground printing establishment. Due to the lack of evidence against 
him, he was released in 1908. As a result of the police record in Siberia Kirov had to hide in 
Irkutsk and Novonikolaevsk until 1909 when he moved to Vladikavkaz in North Caucasus. 
The Vladikavkaz period was an important stage in Kirov‟s life. There he started working at a 
local newspaper Terek first as a corrector then later as a journalist and a senior editor. During 
his work in the Terek he met his future wife Maria Lvovna. In Vladikavkaz he first started to 
sign his articles under the name of S. Kirov and since then he became known as Sergei Kirov. 
It is uncertain whether he chose his pseudonym in honour of an ancient Persian general, or his 
name originated from the Greek word Kir, meaning a warrior, or whether he accidently 
picked the name of the saint Kira from a calendar of saint names.
47
  
The Vladikavkaz period is central in the discussion of Kirov‟s political preferences before the 
October Revolution of 1917. Several times throughout his political career Kirov would be 
accused of deviation from Bolshevism on the grounds of his working in Terek. Apparently 
Terek was a daily newspaper of liberal editorial policy.
48
 Writing for a bourgeois newspaper 
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on a regular basis made Kirov‟s revolutionary involvement questionable from the orthodox 
Bolshevik point of view. The Bolsheviks generally did not approve using the non-party press 
for the main Party debates.
49
 Nevertheless, it should be noted that in some cases the 
Bolsheviks allowed some participation in the non party press for the promotion of the Social 
Democratic ideas. Lenin himself in 1909 urged party members to spread revolutionary ideas 
by any means possible, legal or illegal.
50
 Soviet scholars, for example, justified Kirov‟s 
working in the Terek as a legitimate way for the promotion of the ideas of Social Democracy 
and as a way to attract more party members.
51
 Moreover, professional revolutionaries usually 
had some legal supplemental occupations in addition to underground responsibilities. The 
question was whether that occupation was compatible or not with those activities 
ideologically.  
Due to the inhibiting effect of the Czarist censorship, it is difficult to estimate Kirov‟s actual 
political inclinations in the Terek. Throughout his work in the newspaper Kirov published 
thousands of articles. He covered a broad spectre of various topics: political, economic and 
social. His articles included such urgent for that time issues as hardships of peasants, the 
struggle of the working class against capitalism, the agrarian question, ethnical disunity in the 
Terek region, failures of the tsar and the Duma and foreign affairs.
52
 He criticised the Czarist 
regime. In many ways Kirov revealed himself as a revolutionary in his writing, but it is 
questionable whether he distinguished himself as a real Leninist at that time.   
The Soviet sources portrayed Kirov as an active revolutionary and a real Leninist, besides his 
journalist work in Vladikavkaz. According to the Soviet accounts he arranged political 
Sunday schools, spread illegal revolutionary literature, spoke at the May demonstration and 
read Lenin‟s works. In addition to that, Kirov preserved contacts with Moscow, and tried to 
restore a friendly relationship with neighbouring Bolsheviks.
53
 Nevertheless, it should be 
taken into consideration that Soviet sources could exaggerate Kirov‟s political involvement. 
For instance, there is a suggestion that the chief purpose of the ties with neighbouring 
Bolsheviks was to obtain illegal Marxist literature rather than to coordinate underground 
activities.
54
 Although Kirov participated in the revival of the Social Democratic movement in 
the Caucasus, other Bolsheviks, such as Noi Buachidze and Mamiia Orakhelashvili, seemed 
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to play a more decisive role in the reviving of the revolutionary organisation in the Caucasus 
than Kirov.
55
 Further doubts about Kirov‟s devotion to Bolshevism were drawn on the 
grounds of Kirov‟s support to the bourgeois Provisional Government, which was set up as a 
result of abdication of the tsar Nicholas II in February 1917. 
DEVIATIONS FROM BOLSHEVISM 
The period before the October Revolution of 1917, when the Bolsheviks seized power, has 
been labelled as a period of vacillation and doubt in Kirov‟s political life. Kirov sympathised 
with the Provisional Government. The Bolsheviks, under the leadership of Lenin, did not 
approve of cooperation with either the Provisional Government, labelled as bourgeois 
government, or the Petrograd Soviet, which consisted of other Socialist parties, such as the 
Mensheviks. Mensheviks, on the other hand, favoured some cooperation with the Provisional 
Government. Lenin claimed that cooperation with the Provisional government would put the 
revolution on hold, while Kirov suggested that the establishment of the Provisional 
Government was only the first act on the way to the revolution and gave opportunities for the 
strengthening of the Bolshevik positions in the Terek region. 56  Consequently, Kirov‟s 
sympathetic statements about the Provisional Government placed him on the side of the 
Mensheviks rather than the Bolsheviks in the spring of 1917. Kirov‟s articles written in the 
period between March and July 1917 were not published in later years in the Soviet Union, 
and references to them were not allowed.
57
  
Soviet historians justified Kirov‟s position towards the Provisional government as a 
consequence of the lack of information coming from the centre. Generally regional 
Bolsheviks seemed to be surprised by the abdication of the tsar and events in Petrograd in 
February. Much stayed unclear in the regional committees and the Bolsheviks did not know 
what strategy to pursue further. Since the Bolsheviks in Petrograd did not collaborate with 
local Bolsheviks, Kirov was forced to act based on the conditions in Vladikavkaz. 
Presumably, Lenin‟s policies were slow to take hold in regional committees, not only in 
Vladikavkaz and reports reaching Vladikavkaz concerning developments in Petrograd were 
not detailed enough to enable Kirov to evaluate the Provisional Government correctly.
58
 This 
fact may be supported by the argument that a Bolshevik, Noi Buachidze, was sent to the 
Terek region from the centre to persuade local Bolsheviks in Vladikavkaz to support the 
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Leninist line and split with the Mensheviks. Therefore, one may assume that Kirov was 
actually not fully aware of the Bolshevik programme in Petrograd and that is the reason he 
showed full support for the newly set government. Nevertheless, even after Lenin‟s April 
thesis in 1917 when he presented the official Bolshevik line, Kirov still showed support to the 
Provisional Government.
59
 Hence Kirov‟s choice to support the Provisional Government was 
a conscious one from his personal persuasions.  
It seems like Kirov‟s incongruent political position with the Bolsheviks was determined by 
his understanding of the local socio-political circumstances in the Terek region. There were 
many heterogeneous ethnical groups in the Terek region. Ninety percent of the population 
was engaged in agriculture and there was little proletariat in general. Moreover, there was no 
strong Bolshevik organisation, but a united Party Committee where the Mensheviks 
represented a majority.
60
 Therefore Kirov could alienate himself in his regional party by 
officially joining the Bolshevik claims of no cooperation. The fact that, aside from Kirov, the 
Bolshevik organization in Vladikavkaz had only seven members in the period between 1912 
and 1914, and by 1917 total membership had dropped to six, illustrates the lack of a united 
revolutionary movement in Vladikavkaz. 61  Perhaps it is the reason why Kirov and the 
remaining Bolsheviks in Vladikavkaz favoured the establishment of the united Socialist bloc 
as their only option of survival as Bolsheviks.  
Kirov believed that the first step was to unite fighting groups and win the support from 
mountain people and the peasants. The democratic principle of presentation presented by the 
Provisional Government could be the best suited way to unite the belligerent peoples in 
Terek. The establishment of the power of the Soviet presented by workers and a sudden 
revolution could alienate mountain people and cause only more fighting between different 
opposed ethnic groupings in the region. Kirov rather supported gradual transition.  
Lenin, on the other hand, acted from Petrograd as a reaction to the local circumstances there. 
It is questionable whether there was one consensual Bolshevik philosophy in 1917. The 
backgrounds of different revolutionaries seem to produce an impression of a diverse 
movement led by individuals with different political outlooks. Therefore Kirov‟s support of 
the Provisional Government and cooperation with the Mensheviks was not unique in the 
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RSDRP. There were other prominent Bolsheviks, such as Lev Kamenev and Joseph Stalin, 
who favoured some cooperation with the Mensheviks before April 1917.
62
  
Kirov‟s approving position towards the Provisional Government was shared by most other 
Bolshevik groups in the Terek Region.
63
 To conclude, Kirov‟s revolutionary outlook in the 
Terek region was determined by regional developments. Although Kirov did not participate 
actively in the October events in Petrograd in 1917, he played an important role in the 
establishment of the Terek Republic and the Soviet power throughout Terek.
64
 Kirov‟s clear 
position with the Bolshevik party became clear after the Second All-Russian Congress of 
Soviets held in late October 1917. 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SOVIET POWER  
After the establishment of the Bolshevik power in the Soviet Union Kirov began loyally 
follow the Bolshevik line. During the Civil war, from 1918 to 1921, he was sent to Astrakhan 
in 1919 to maintain order in the region. Apparently Kirov was personally responsible for the 
bloodshed during the Astrakhan revolt.
65
 After the revolt in Astrakhan, Kirov together with 
other prominent Bolsheviks, such as Sergo Ordzhonikidze and Anastas Mikoyan, actively 
participated in the “sovietisation” of the Caucasus. He defended the idea of independence of 
such republics as Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, which Stalin, for example, resisted.
66
 At 
the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921 Kirov was elected a candidate member of the highest 
body, the Central Committee, of the Soviet Workers Party, later known as the Communist 
Party. After the “sovietisation” of Azerbaijan, with the support of Lenin, Stalin and 
Ordzhonikidze, Kirov was appointed in 1921 as secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist 
Party.
67
 As a regional party secretary, Kirov had responsibilities for both political and 
economic matters in the region.  Azerbaijan was an important oil region for the economy of 
the Soviet Union. Kirov‟s top priority was development of the oil industry in the region.68 In 
the period between 1917 and 1926 Kirov asserted his position as a staunch Bolshevik. He was 
acquainted with many prominent Bolsheviks and promoted his position in the hierarchy of the 
Party. He proved himself a decisive and careful administrator in Azerbaijan. His popularity 
was mainly limited to the Caucasus but he was already known then to Stalin.  
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The first meeting between Kirov and Stalin probably happened during the Second All Soviet 
Congress in 1917 in Petrograd, where both Stalin and Kirov were delegates. Apparently Stalin 
devoted his attention specifically towards the delegation from the North Caucasus and 
Transcaucasia, where Kirov was a member. Although Stalin was initially sceptical of 
transferring Kirov to the Caucasus because Kirov advanced nationalist demands of the 
republics in the Caucasus, in 1918 Stalin personally recommended Kirov in a letter where he 
wrote that Kirov deserved full trust.
69
 The relationship between the two became closer after 
Kirov‟s appointment as a secretary of Azerbaijan in 1921. For instance, in 1924 Stalin 
presented Kirov with the book Lenin and Leninism with an inscription, „To S.M. Kirov, my 
friend and beloved brother, from the author. 23.05.24. Stalin‟. Apparently Stalin gave signed 
copies of his books to very few people.
70
 Moreover, numerous letters in the early 1920s 
between Kirov, Stalin and Ordzhonikidze reveal a friendly relationship between them.  
POLITICAL INTRIGUES 
Kirov seemed to play only a secondary role in the question of political competition that 
happened after Lenin‟s death in 1924. Although Lenin himself projected the principle of 
collective leadership after his death, there were several contenders for his position as the 
leader of the Bolshevik Party. The principal rivals were Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, 
Kamenev and Stalin. Each of the Bolshevik leaders believed in a one-party state and the 
differences with Lenin‟s political heritage touched mainly secondary matters.71 Leon Trotsky, 
for example, wished to expand state planning, accelerate industrialisation and instigate 
revolution in Europe. Due to his position as a founder of the Red Army, Trotsky was 
considered by Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev as a dangerous contender for Lenin‟s leading 
position. In order to prevent Trotsky from succeeding Lenin and establishing a military 
regime, Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev joined an alliance against Trotsky‟s candidacy.  
Kirov was far from the centre of the political intrigues that were happening at the top after 
Lenin‟s death. Nevertheless, as a regional party chief he was most likely aware of the events 
in Moscow. It is remarkable that Zinoviev and Kamenev were also worrying about Stalin‟s 
position in the party. Apparently, before Lenin‟s death the two conferred with Ordzhonikidze, 
who was a close friend of Kirov, as to how best to reduce Stalin‟s powers.72 It may be 
assumed that Kirov was aware both of the political struggle against Trotsky as well as 
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Zinoviev‟s and Kamenev‟s annoyance with Stalin. It is unclear from the first-hand sources 
whether Kirov had any defined opinion about the political struggle after Lenin‟s death. As a 
party secretary of Azerbaijan Kirov followed general developments that were happening in 
the centre and vigorously fought the Trotskyites in the Caucasus.
73
 
In his speeches delivered in Baku around that time Kirov condemned Trotsky‟s position of the 
so-called permanent revolution. Trotsky suggested that Socialist revolution should be spread 
to Western Europe in order for the Russian revolution to survive. Kirov did not seem to play 
more of a special role in the struggle against Trotskyites than any other regional party chief. 
Kirov‟s sympathies with Stalin became apparent in the question regarding the expulsion of 
Leon Trotsky. Zinoviev and Kamenev demanded Trotsky‟s expulsion from the party in 1925, 
whereas Stalin considered it to be unnecessary. Despite his disapproval of Trotsky‟s political 
standpoints and not particularly friendly relations with him, like Stalin, Kirov also held a 
rather moderate position concerning Trotsky‟s expulsion from the party. Kirov‟s position in 
the question of Trotsky‟s expulsion from the Bolshevik party may be interpreted as a sign of 
allegiance to Stalin in 1925. However, on the other hand Kirov based his position on the 
question on the grounds of Trotsky‟s loyalty to Bolshevism, noticing that no matter what he 
was one of the Old Bolsheviks who led the October Revolution and therefore should keep his 
membership in the Bolshevik party.
74
 Moreover, according to Kirov, Trotsky alone did not 
seem to represent a threat for the party unity. Kirov‟s moderate position towards Trotsky 
mirrors of that cautious and tolerant position towards the Mensheviks before the October 
Revolution. Hence, such attitude could characterise Kirov as a politician generally tolerant of 
other political streams. Kirov‟s alliance with Stalin became apparent by the end of 1925 when 
he was personally chosen by Stalin to fight the Left Opposition formed by Zinoviev and 
Kamenev in Leningrad, the second most important party committee in the Soviet Union. 
CONCLUSION 
Soviet sources presented Kirov‟s background as an exemplary biography of a good 
Bolshevik. Due to a limited amount of primary sources, it is generally difficult to estimate 
Kirov‟s actual political inclinations before 1917. From the existing material it may seem that 
Kirov accommodated to the local circumstances. Besides some involvement in the 
underground revolutionary activities, Kirov did not occupy any significant political position 
before the October Revolution as his position is unclear. Although he seemed to consider 
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himself a Bolshevik his position seemed to be closer to the Menshevik one. Therefore in some 
way Kirov was rightfully accused of vacillation between different revolutionary movements 
before accepting Bolshevism in 1917. Kirov‟s adherence to Bolshevism clearly was 
manifested after the October Revolution. Since then he proved to be a staunch Bolshevik. In 
the early 1920s he presented himself as a good “practical” Bolshevik rather than theoreticians 
like Lenin or Trotsky. Although his popularity was generally limited to the Caucasus region, 
he had already at that time established good relations with Stalin and other prominent 
Bolsheviks who would play an influential role later during the Stalin regime.    
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CHAPTER 3: LENINGRAD PARTY CHIEF 
SERGEI KIROV AND THE OPPOSITION IN LENINGRAD, 1926 TO 1928 
INTRODUCTION  
In 1926, on the personal insistence of Stalin and by the decision of the Communist Party 
leadership, Sergei Kirov was delegated to Leningrad to fight the so-called Leningrad 
Oppositionists headed by the local Bolshevik party leader Grigory Zinoviev. The temporary 
assignment to crash the Leningrad Opposition resulted in Kirov‟s permanent transfer to 
Leningrad as the replacement for Zinoviev. The appointment as the leader of the Leningrad 
regional committee, Obkom, marked the beginning of a significant period in Kirov‟s political 
career. As a regional secretary of the Soviet Union‟s second most important party 
organisation, Kirov entered into the centre of Soviet politics. He found himself among the 
Party elite and close associates of Stalin. This chapter will be devoted to Kirov‟s political 
position in the period during Stalin‟s struggle against the Left Opposition, and later during the 
campaign against the United Opposition between 1926 and 1927. 
MOSCOW VERSUS LENINGRAD 
Kirov‟s work in Leningrad originated in the conflict that occurred between Stalin and his 
allies and the New or Left Opposition. In addition to personal ambitions to substitute Lenin as 
the leader of the Bolshevik Party, the core of the conflict between the two factions lay in the 
ideological and economic disputes between the leaders of the groups Stalin, Bukharin, Rykov 
and Tomsky on the one hand, and Zinoviev, Kamenev and Krupskaya, who was Lenin‟s wife, 
on the other. At the Fourteenth Party Congress, held in December 1925, the Left Opposition, 
under the leadership of the head of the Leningrad Party organisation Grigory Zinoviev and the 
Moscow Party Secretary Lev Kamenev, was criticised for not following the party‟s 
resolutions and for the establishment of the separate faction within the Party.
75
 A Party 
Congress was the supreme ruling body of the Bolshevik/Communist Party, where different 
resolutions were adopted. Factions within the Bolshevik party were officially banned during 
Lenin regime in 1921.  
Under the leadership of a party theorist, Nikolai Bukharin, Stalin‟s majority faction, 
supported the gradual transition to socialism on the basis of Lenin‟s New Economic Policy, 
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NEP, whereas the Left Opposition demanded the abolishment of the NEP. The NEP was 
launched under the leadership of Lenin in 1921 as a necessary economic retreat policy which 
aimed at peaceful incorporation of peasantry. As a result of the NEP, the grain requisitioning 
was replaced by the tax in kind which allowed peasants to sell their surplus.
 76
 Although 
originally NEP was acknowledged as a necessary economic retreat, in 1925 the Left 
Opposition launched the critique of the NEP as the deviation from Socialism and labelled it as 
a capitalist policy. Stalin and Bukharin were supported by the majority of the Politburo, 
policy-making body. Kirov was not a Politburo member yet, but at the Fourteenth Party 
Congress he openly sided with the majority faction against the Zinoviev‟s group.  
Kirov openly condemned positions of the Left Oppositionists at the Fourteenth Congress, 
saying that the Oppositionists „drove themselves in a rather packed (тесный) corner‟. In his 
speech he urged the comrades to help the Oppositionists to find the “correct” path.77 By the 
correct path he most likely meant the preservation of Lenin‟s ideals of the democratic 
centralism and supporting the resolutions on the economic policies adopted by the Fourteenth 
Congress. He stated that “any deviation from the majority views was dangerous at the time of 
such a transformation”.78 Kirov generally seemed to favour Lenin‟s NEP and its “smychka”, 
the union between the workers and the peasants. At the Fourteenth Congress he presented 
himself as a cautious politician by indicating that the situation in the countryside, especially in 
the Caucasus, was quite complicated and “required a more thorough analysis than hasty 
conclusions presented by Kamenev and the Left Opposition”. He added that “the NEP created 
the necessary means for the state to influence economic relations in the countryside”.79 In his 
speech he also noted that “dekulakisation”, understood then as the compulsory extraction of 
surplus from the relatively rich peasants, kulaks, proposed by the Leftist leaders, would not 
improve the situation in the countryside and that the NEP was the most suited policy for the 
existing situation in the countryside.
80
 From Kirov‟s statements it seems that his support to 
the NEP measures was dictated by local conditions in his region, where peasantry represented 
the majority of the population.  
From the stenographic reports from the Fourteenth Congress Stalin was cautious during his 
speech. He revealed himself as a kind of an arbiter between Bukharin and Zinoviev. He 
condemned the Oppositionist position like the rest of the majority. Nevertheless, at the same 
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time he said he was against the elimination policy: “We stand for unity, we are against 
amputation. The policy of amputation is abhorrent to us.”81 Molotov, one of Stalin‟s staunch 
followers, implied in his speech at the Fourteenth Congress that “Zinoviev‟s faction was a 
mere deviation and that their political line was not parallel to that of the Central 
Committee”.82 Therefore Kirov‟s position towards the Left Opposition was in concord with 
Stalin and his supporters in 1925. Stalin‟s faction was, by and large, cautious towards the 
Leningrad Opposition in their official statements.  
The question of loyalty to Stalin is especially important regarding the Fourteenth Party 
Congress, because Kamenev and the Left Opposition brought up the issue of the growing 
political power in Stalin‟s hands as the General Secretary of the Bolshevik party. The Party‟s 
Secretariat was the main centre for party administration where the General Secretary obtained 
control over the personnel appointment.
83
 It is arguable whether the post of the General 
Secretary was decisive in Stalin‟s rising authority in the Party. There is the view that due to 
the occupied post, Stalin exercised control over the personnel and therefore was able to 
establish a network of loyal party members throughout the country which provided the ground 
for his personal leadership.
84
 Unlike other Stalin supporters who flattered Stalin in their 
speeches, such as Kuibyshev for example, Kirov in his speech mentioned Stalin only once 
saying that Stalin was right noting that those who had oil would predominate.
85
 There is no 
information in Kirov personal files of what he thought of Stalin‟s rising power at that time. 
Nevertheless, Kirov‟s appreciation of the NEP and good personal relationship with Stalin 
contributed to his appointment as a member of the delegation, headed by Molotov, to fight 
Left Oppositionists in Leningrad in the beginning of 1926. Kirov‟s appointment in the 
delegation among other prominent Bolsheviks, such as Molotov, Mikoyan and 
Ordzhonikidze, signified the Party‟s and Stalin‟s reliance on Kirov in such important work.  
LENINGRAD - “THE CRADLE OF THE REVOLUTION” 
Leningrad, which was known as Petrograd before Lenin‟s death, was considered to be an 
important political and economic centre in the Soviet Union. Yevdokimov, a Petrograd Party 
chairman in the 1920s, probably did not exaggerate when he noted in 1925 that, „any blow 
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against Leningrad was considered a blow against the entire party‟.86 Since 1917 the Petrograd 
party organisation, renamed Leningrad in 1924, was one of the leading organisations in the 
Soviet Union. Historically it was an important political and cultural centre, labelled the 
“cradle of the proletariat revolution”, the place where the October Revolution originated. Due 
to the high concentration of the proletariat in comparison to other Russian cities and regions, 
Lenin himself attached significant importance to the Petrograd party committee saying that 
„the Petrograd workers should set an example for the rest‟.87 Economically, Leningrad was the 
most important industrial city in the country by 1925. 
Unlike Lenin, Stalin was not specifically fond of Leningrad; he seldom visited Leningrad.
88
 
As the „window to the West‟89, Leningrad historically was a symbol of connections between 
Russia and the Western world. That is why it was perceived by Stalin as „a breeding route for 
flourish of foreign ideas and oppositional tendencies‟.90 Since Leningrad was an important 
political centre where ninety percent of the ten thousand members supported the Zinoviev‟s 
line
91
, it was therefore important for Stalin to conquer the support of the Leningrad proletariat 
to strengthen his authority there.  
CRASHING THE LENINGRAD OPPOSITION 
Kirov vigorously promoted the CC‟s resolutions by speaking at the factories, plants and party 
committees in Leningrad. Several of Kirov‟s contemporaries noted that Kirov was a very 
skilful orator. He has been often presented as the only utter orator within the Stalin‟s circle. 
He generally spoke in a rather approachable manner and simplified complex issues, so that 
they became clear to the common audience. Noted by one of Kirov‟s biographers, „He [Kirov] 
seemed to be higher than he actually was while speaking at the meetings‟. 92  From the 
examined speeches Kirov really seem to appear as a convincing and inspiring orator. The 
language he used was rather expressive in its nature due to the use of bright comparisons and 
idioms. Although Kirov was an educated and well-read politician, he used language 
understandable to common workers. Due to the use of slang his speeches became appealing 
and captivating for the audience. From the correspondence with other party members, it is 
clear that Kirov was very busy in Leningrad speaking at the meetings. For example, Kirov 
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wrote to Ordzhonikidze on 16 January 1926 about his tough work in Leningrad.
93
 According 
to the Soviet sources Kirov‟s oratory skills played a significant role in the Party‟s campaign 
against the Leftist Opposition.  
Even though the Soviet researchers presented Kirov as the main hero in the struggle against 
the Opposition in Leningrad, it is arguable how central his role actually was. Firstly, there 
were only ten meetings out of eighty that were led personally by Kirov. From reading the 
local newspaper Leningradskaia Pravda in January, the impression is that Kirov did not 
occupy any more special position than other members of the CC delegation in Leningrad. It 
should be, however, noted that this was not extraordinary since Kirov was not very famous 
yet in Leningrad at that time. From the Leningradskaia Pravda it is also evident that Kirov 
gradually acquired more space on its pages.  
There is practically no correspondence between Kirov and Stalin in the correspondence part 
between Stalin and other members of the Party in the period during the campaign against the 
Left Opposition between 8 January 1926 and 10 May 1927. From the overview of Stalin‟s 
letters in general, it seems that Stalin acquired his information from Molotov rather than 
Kirov in the beginning of 1926.
94
 As it has been mentioned in the introduction, some of the 
letters between Stalin and Kirov could have been extracted after Kirov‟s death by one of 
Kirov‟s friends. Kirov‟s role in Leningrad should not be underestimated either: in total he 
delivered 180 speeches against the Opposition during the political campaign in Leningrad.
95
 
From the statements of the Left Opposition at the Politburo meeting on the question of the 
president of the Leningrad Soviet on 18 March 1926, it was evident that other methods than 
merely speaking at the Party committees were also utilised by the Party leadership.
96
  Those 
included the taking over of the party press, mass dismissal of the leading staff of Leningrad 
that was founded during the Zinoviev time, repressions of the activists and their exile, severe 
reprimands and warnings at the working places and the re-election of the regional 
committees.
97
 In addition to those means, the leaders of the Left Opposition were allowed to 
visit Leningrad only on personal matters.
98
 Throughout the spring of 1926 it was decided by 
the Party, on personal initiation of Stalin, to appoint Kirov as a secretary of the Leningrad 
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party committee instead of Zinoviev. Stalin‟s personal choice of Kirov demonstrated his 
confidence in Kirov‟s candidacy for the post of regional party boss. 
STALIN’S CHOICE 
It was not a casual matter that Kirov was chosen to take over Zinoviev‟s role in Leningrad. 
Stalin generally seemed to give considerate thought to administrational matters. Regional 
leadership occupied an important role in the administration of the Soviet Union. Its main 
responsibilities were to advocate central resolutions in the regions, define further provincial 
developments in line with central policies and watch the implementation of central 
resolutions. The main threat to defining the “correct” line could therefore originate from the 
personal vacillations and political preferences of the leaders, as occurred in the case of 
Zinoviev. Therefore, Stalin needed the officials who would not only understand central 
directives, but also regard them as their own.
99
 Kirov was known as a Bolshevik loyal to the 
general line of the party after the October Revolution. Out of the characterisations sent to the 
CC by the Baku workers in 1925, it is seen that Kirov was highly respected in Azerbaijan. 
That portrayal revealed Kirov as a talented administrator and a responsible politician:  
Kirov is able to adjust himself quickly to complicated political situations. He is a counterbalanced 
worker with great political tactfulness. He is consistent and self-controlled. He is very persistent 
regarding implementation of the resolutions, especially of the higher party bodies. He is able to 
choose workers in all areas of work and to supervise them.  Special advantage is that he is the first 
class and magnificent orator.
100
  
Kirov‟s friend Ordzhonikidze wrote a letter to Leningrad in the early 1926 noting that, „Kirov 
was the right candidate for the task and that he would most smoothly restore the unity in 
Leningrad‟.101 Moreover, Stalin was personally acquainted with Kirov and had a very friendly 
relationship with him. Stalin needed a loyal follower in Leningrad. In order to avoid influence 
from the Zinovievites, Stalin required a person who did not have any connections either with 
the Leningrad Party staff or with the Leningrad proletariat.
102
 Due to the remote position in 
Azerbaijan Kirov did not have any close connections with Leningrad and he had been to 
Leningrad only four times throughout his political career.
103
 Stalin‟s personal choice of Kirov 
and his entrustment in leading such an important Party organisation as Leningrad 
demonstrates Stalin‟s confidence in Kirov. Stalin showed his support of Kirov by visiting him 
several times in Leningrad. 
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TRANSFER TO LENINGRAD 
Kirov‟s private correspondence in 1925 and 1926 with his wife Maria Lvovna and his friend 
Ordzhonikidze, who like Kirov also stood close to Stalin, can reveal Kirov‟s attitude towards 
his transfer to Leningrad as well as his thoughts about the conflict in the party. The letters 
addressed to Maria Lvovna implied that Kirov did not only wish to move to Leningrad, but 
also tried to prevent his permanent transfer there, but it was of no avail: 
They are transferring me from Baku to Leningrad, where an unbelievable squabble is going on... I 
tried everything to resist it, but nothing helped. My mood is awful. I have never felt so badly.
104
  
In accordance with the party discipline principle the decision of the CC had to be 
unconditionally followed by the Bolsheviks. By discipline the Bolsheviks basically meant 
obedience to higher decisions. Decisions of party centres were binding on all members.
105
 
Since the underground years the party members followed the expression that those „who were 
not with them where against them‟. Therefore Kirov had to admit his promotion in Leningrad 
despite his personal wishes to stay in Baku. In his letters to his wife Kirov appeared insecure 
and frustrated about his transfer to Leningrad where he did not have any acquaintances. In the 
beginning of 1926, he wrote to his wife that, „he did not wish to move to the terrible state of 
affairs in Leningrad‟.106 Although Kirov condemned the Opposition‟s position in 1925, from 
his personal letters to his wife it was obvious that he disliked the situation that was happening 
in Leningrad: 
During the Congress Sergo [Ordzhonikidze] and I were sent there [Leningrad] with reports, the 
situation was unbearable... Dear Marusia, how difficult it is to admit that I am going to an awful 
situation in Petersburg.
107
 
From Kirov‟s reaction towards transfer to Leningrad, it is clear that he did not have personal 
ambitions to be promoted to the central position in the Communist party. Nevertheless, one 
should probably not exaggerate Kirov‟s negative reaction to his promotion. Although Kirov 
was known for his tolerance, it seems like his reluctance towards moving to Leningrad did not 
lie in his political patience towards Zinoviev, but rather his personal preference to proceed 
with the unfinished work in Azerbaijan rather than being in the centre of a profound political 
quarrel. From the correspondence preserved in the RGASPI, it is evident that Kirov was very 
close to the Baku Bolsheviks and thought that it was unnecessary to transfer him from 
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Baku.
108
 Moreover, Kirov was a rather disciplined person, therefore moving to Leningrad was 
a great responsibility for him. After moving to Leningrad he wrote to his wife, „The state of 
affairs here is very complicated, there is work for twenty-four hours. I am not sure how it will 
develop. Anyway I feel terrible. The task is very responsible‟.109 He realised that working 
there would have placed him in the centre of all the intrigues and Kirov seemed to be unsure 
whether he would manage with the given task: „I have no certainty that I will manage to hold 
out there [Leningrad]‟.110  
Kirov‟s negative reaction towards his work in Leningrad may also be explained by hostility 
towards him by the local party members. He wrote in his letters to his wife and 
Ordzhonikidze about CC members generally being met with hostility in Leningrad.
111
 The 
Zinovievites spread information about Kirov‟s past saying that he was writing for a liberal 
newspaper before the Revolution and was not a significant figure in the Party.
112
 Therefore 
Kirov was considered an outsider by the Leningrad Bolsheviks. As mentioned by Kirov‟s 
Soviet biographer, Krasnikov, the Leningrad Bolsheviks had been used to stand close to 
Lenin himself, whereas Kirov was provincial and relatively unknown in Leningrad.
113
  
In Kirov‟s personal correspondences there is no direct statement about the Opposition or 
Zinoviev. There is more information about his work in Leningrad in general. Amy Knight 
claimed that in one of his letters to Maria Lvovna, Kirov implied that “he was against of 
forcing the Zinovievites out of the party. He wanted to put the question to a democratic 
vote.”114 It is unfortunate that Knight did not refer to the letter she used as an evidence for 
Kirov‟s tolerance towards the Zinovievites. From the analysed letters there is no inclination 
towards that claim. Since Knight referred to the same letters from the RGASPI, the argument 
about Kirov‟s wish to put to a democratic vote is questionable. 
KIROV AND THE UNITED OPPOSITION  
The factional conflicts within the Soviet Communist party did not cease with the Zinoviev‟s 
removal from Leningrad. Despite the pressure on Zinoviev and Kamenev to admit the 
resolutions of the Fourteenth Congress and its policies, they did not obey to join the CC and 
Stalin majority. Instead, at the plenary session of the CC in July 1926, regardless of the 
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differences in the political outlooks, they joined against the Stalin‟s grouping with Trotsky 
and the rest of the smaller oppositional groupings, known as the United Opposition. Among 
other demands the faction asked for greater freedom for discussion within the Party and less 
bureaucracy. By October 1926, with Trotsky at its head, the United Opposition was 
eventually accused by the Stalin majority of violation of party principles by engaging in the 
illegal factional activities and the organisation of a separate party.
115
 As a result of a lengthy 
struggle between Stalin‟s majority and the United Opposition proceeding throughout 1926 
and 1927, Trotsky and Zinoviev were expelled from the Party at the Fifteenth Congress that 
was held in December 1927.  
As in the case with the Left Opposition, Kirov loyally supported the resolutions of the CC and 
the overall developments that were happening at the top level of the Communist Party. Like 
the rest of the members of the Stalinist grouping, Kirov‟s speeches delivered at the CC 
meetings and at the regional meetings in Leningrad revealed his discrepancy with the 
Opposition‟s views. He devotedly condemned the Opposition‟s factional activities.  
Regarding the dissertation‟s main theme of Kirov‟s position towards the Oppositionists it is 
especially interesting to discuss his role at the plenary session of the CC in October 1926. At 
that session Kirov and the Leningrad delegation initiated the question of expulsion of Trotsky 
from the Politburo, Kamenev as the candidate to membership in the Politburo and Zinoviev as 
the chairman of the Comintern.
116
 This fact is often used by historians to prove Kirov‟s 
unconditional devotion to Stalin‟s principles. From Kirov‟s speeches, it may in fact seem that 
his position was not different from the Stalinists‟ in 1926. Like Molotov and Stalin, Kirov 
also accused the United Opposition in the establishment of a separate party, concluding that 
the Opposition had all the necessary elements for leading a parallel organisation, such as 
illegal publication, illegal presses, regular illegal meetings that occurred parallel to the CC 
meetings which were necessary to establish a new party.
117
Additionally, like Stalin, Kirov 
constantly emphasised the need for harsher party discipline and the strengthening of the party 
unity.
118
    
It must be considered as to what kind of position Stalin occupied in relation to the Opposition 
in October when Kirov initiated the proposal of their possible dismissal. At the Politburo 
meeting in October 1926, Stalin noted that the Opposition was defeated and the next question 
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raised was whether the Oppositional leaders could keep their membership in the CC. He 
concluded that the CC had no intention of expelling its members and the opposition could 
keep its membership on certain conditions, such as admitting to their faulty position and 
dismissal of the faction.
 119
 It is therefore seen that Kirov‟s position at the plenary session was 
even harsher in some way comparing to the one of Stalin at that time. However, it should be 
noted that Stalin publically seemed to give an impression of a „moderator‟, like at the 
Fourteenth Congress when he was kind of an arbiter between Zinoviev and Bukharin. Stalin 
publically seemed to avoid initiating such serious proposals as excluding members, for 
example. From Stalin‟s letter to Molotov, dated 25 June 1926 it may be claimed that the 
decisions about the Opposition leaders were decided before the plenary session. In that letter 
Stalin presented his views about the Zinoviev‟s group, instructed his closest comrades about 
the future actions against the Opposition and suggested that, „the blow must be struck 
precisely against this group [the Zinoviev‟s group] at the plenum‟.120  
Stalin‟s recommendations were seemed to be followed by his political friends. Trotsky, for 
example, complained between 1923 and 1925 that key decisions were taken prior to formal 
Politburo meetings. In the struggle with the United Opposition, Stalin relied on a leading 
group to prepare the Politburo sessions in advance.
 121
 As Molotov remembered, important 
decisions and votes of the Politburo were always prepared in advance by a smaller group: 
“There was always the leading team in the Politburo ... all issues of prime importance were 
first addressed by the Politburo‟s leading group. That tradition started under Lenin.”122  
Nevertheless, there is no factual proof that Kirov had instructions from the centre to put 
forward the proposition about the expulsion of the leaders of the United Opposition at the 
plenum. One should not, however, exclude the fact that his decision could be influenced by 
what was happening in the internal circles of the Bolshevik Party. Moreover, by the autumn 
of 1926 Kirov had acquired more popularity within the Bolshevik Party and the Leningrad 
organisation. However, since Leningrad was in the middle of the political struggle at the 
Fourteenth Congress and its support of the CC‟s life was questionable, it was necessary for 
Kirov to demonstrate that Leningrad supported the CC‟s majority loyally and fully regarding 
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their campaign against the United Opposition. Hence the proposal of the expulsion was a 
means of showing full support to Stalin‟s majority. 
In my opinion, Kirov‟s position at the October plenum should be discussed in relation to the 
totality of his speeches, especially those delivered later in 1927 and directly regarding the 
expulsion of the oppositionist leaders from the CC and the party. In my opinion, Kirov‟s role 
at the October plenum is often exaggerated, especially of those who wish to prove that 
Kirov‟s position towards the Oppositionists was as harsh as that of Stalin.  
The question of Trotsky‟s and Zinoviev‟s expulsion from the CC came up at the June CC 
plenum in 1927 where the votes of the Communists were evenly divided. Some members, like 
Ordzhonikidze for example, thought that the question should not be decided until the 
Fifteenth Party Congress. Stalin, who was out of town, protested against expulsion.
123
 On 20 
June 1927, a bare majority voted to expel Trotsky and Zinoviev. From the speech delivered in 
Leningrad about the results of that plenum, Kirov‟s reaction seemed to be closer to that of his 
friend Ordzhonikidze. He wrote that despite the fact that the Leningrad delegation was the one 
demanding the expulsion of Trotsky from the CC earlier, meaning the October plenum of 
1926, the situation was more complicated than it seemed.
124
 Kirov noted that although there 
were times when the Bolsheviks were provoked by the speeches of the Opposition and wanted 
to exclude the leaders right away, after considerate thought they came to a different 
conclusion.”125 Kirov claimed that the expulsion of Zinoviev and Trotsky would not decide 
the entire problem of the establishment of a “second” party. Therefore it was more important 
to persuade the supporters of the Opposition of the incorrectness of the views of the 
oppositionists than just expelling the leaders.
126
 Using Kirov‟s words, „it is easier to deal a 
blow and believe that there will be silence‟127 and „If we throw them out, everybody should 
understand why and it is more complicated. Hence other means should be implied than 
exclusion‟. 128  From the speeches Kirov appeared rather tolerant towards the Oppositionists, 
trying to see himself in their places. He noted that, “It was common knowledge that everyone 
in the party would do that without saying, that if he should have been forced to swear he 
would have smacked their heads.”129 He also said that, “in every family there is at least one 
black sheep, the party should not be ashamed of having only ninety six members who voted 
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against the resolutions at the Fifteenth Conference.” 130  Meaning that, ninety six members 
was relatively modest number. He added that there were still means by which to cure those 
members. Even though Kirov did not note which exactly means should be employed, he 
probably implied the means of persuasion, since he noted that from his own experience in 
Leningrad anyone could be persuaded.
131
 
His expressions may be interpreted due to his tolerance towards the Oppositional leaders, but 
this is due to the deeper understanding of the consequences of the expulsion of the 
Oppositional leaders. Kirov assigned a greater role to winning over common members of the 
Party by explaining the differences of political outlooks than simply enforcing the CC‟s will. 
As a result of the demonstration that was arranged by the United Opposition in November, the 
Fifteenth Congress, which was held in December 1927, approved the resolution of the CC, 
dated November 11, to exclude Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Communist Party. Due to the 
demonstration, the United Opposition was accused of taking the internal conflict out into the 
public. Political conflicts must be contained within party bounds.
132
 At the Fifteenth Congress 
Stalin noted that either the opposition accepted their condition of entire dismissal of their 
faction, or they should leave the party, and if they do not leave they would be excluded.
133
 
Kirov‟s statement at the Fifteenth Congress conveyed that he supported fully the Stalinist 
faction in the exclusion of the Opposition from the party. He claimed that the Opposition 
leaders could have been expelled even sooner if Lenin was alive.
134
 He concluded his speech 
saying that the Opposition should be decidedly and mercilessly excluded from the party.
135
 
Despite his statements earlier in 1927, it seems that Kirov genuinely believed in the wrong 
position of the Opposition by the end of 1927.  
CONCLUSION 
Kirov loyally followed the party‟s resolutions and decisions in Leningrad in the political 
campaign against Oppositionists. His political vision was totally in line with the majority of 
the Politburo. He supported the continuation of the NEP provided by Bukharin and Stalin and 
condemned behaviour of the Oppositionists. On one occasion he even suggested the expulsion 
of Oppositionists from the Party. During his first years as a regional party chief in Leningrad, 
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Kirov proved himself as a reliable associate of Stalin and his supporters. As a result he was 
appointed as a candidate member of the Politburo in the summer of 1927. Despite his personal 
reluctance to transfer to Leningrad and the hostility with which Kirov was met there, Kirov 
gradually strengthened his authority in Leningrad and was accepted by the local Bolsheviks. 
The Oppositionists were driven out of Leningrad and Leningrad proved to be loyal to the 
CC‟s line. Generally, it may be concluded that from his work in Leningrad, Kirov appeared as 
a talented and responsible politician, who was dutiful and loyally followed the general line, 
which automatically became his own line.  
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CHAPTER 4: STALIN’S REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE  
THE RIGHT DEVIATION, INDUSTRIALISATION AND COLLECTIVISATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Starting in 1928, Stalin and his supporters initiated a new set of policies based on 
comprehensive collectivisation of peasants and accelerated industrialisation. Stalin‟s 
revolution from above, as it is also otherwise known, saw the shift of the general policies 
caused further disagreements within the Soviet leadership. This time the conflict occurred 
between Stalin and his clique on the one hand and Stalin‟s earlier allies, the Rightists typified 
by Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, on the other. Since Kirov agreed with Stalin and the 
Rightists in their approval of the NEP and gradualist approach to economic development 
earlier, the question is which faction did he choose to support? This chapter will examine 
Kirov‟s position towards Stalin‟s policies of collectivisation and industrialisation in the period 
from 1927 until 1931. The main question is whether Kirov loyally supported Stalin‟s 
initiatives throughout the period or whether he demonstrated some reservation to the new 
strategy.   
NEW POLICIES, NEW FACTIONAL STRUGGLES 
From 1928, Stalin and his associates launched a series of reforms that gradually caused the 
abolition of Lenin‟s NEP. Despite the NEP‟s positive results, such as civil peace, political 
stability and economic recovery, the NEP had caused the growth of a new class of 
independent producers, who were relatively better-off peasants, known as the kulaks. Being a 
private trader, the kulak wished to sell his grain surplus privately rather than voluntarily 
submitting it to the state. The retaining of the grain led to a serious procurement crisis in the 
countryside and caused a lack of food in the cities and the army in the of late 1927 to the 
beginning of 1928. Hence, the main aim of the state was to establish control over food 
production in the countryside. 
As a solution to the procurement crisis Stalin and his followers introduced the so-called 
“emergency measures”, chrezvichainie mery. These measures included such policies as the 
forced expropriation of grain from peasants, ultimately forced collectivisation, the joining into 
collective farms, kolkhoz, and dekulakisation, raskulachivanie, the liquidation of peasants‟ 
property. Stalin and his loyal followers insisted on the extension of the forced collectivisation 
of the peasants and higher pace for industrialisation. On the other hand, Bukharin and his 
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supporters, Rykov and Tomsky, demanded a retreat from the emergency course regardless of 
the economic and political consequences and continuation of the NEP measures. At the 
meeting of the CC in January 1929, Stalin‟s opponents were accused of factionalism and were 
labelled as Right deviationists. The question is whether Kirov and other Party members 
unconditionally supported Stalin in his campaign against the Bukharinites as they did in the 
fight against the Leftists, taking into consideration that it was Stalin who actually opposed the 
General Line of the Party at this time.  
KIROV, A WAVERER? 
The gap between speeches in the official collections of Kirov‟s speeches imply that Kirov 
seemed to be rather reserved towards criticism of the Right deviation in his official statements 
in 1928 and 1929. Kirov‟s restrained position towards the Rightists, alongside with the lack of 
his publications, have raised doubts among scholars about his unconditional support of Stalin 
in his campaign against the opponents. Conquest concluded that in the campaign against the 
Right deviation „Kirov never showed the animus of the true Stalinist‟.136 Scholars tended to 
interpret Kirov‟s reserved position towards Bukharin and the Right deviation as original signs 
of unfaithfulness to Stalin and his policies.  
There are several factors that can clarify Kirov‟s reserved position towards the Right wing 
rather than his personal sympathies with the Rightist ideology. First, it should be noted that 
originally there were no overall significant disagreements over the introduction of the 
“emergency measures” within the Communist Party. Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky originally 
supported the selective confiscation of grain from the peasants as a short-term necessity.
137
 
Moreover, selective confiscation of grain did not originally seem to signify the abolition of 
the NEP as such. Even Stalin himself denied NEP‟s abolishment in one of his speeches about 
the first results of the procurement campaign in 1928: “The talk to the effect that we are 
abolishing NEP, that we are introducing the surplus-appropriation system, dekulakisation is 
counter-revolutionary chatter that must be combated.”138 As a result the party members could 
assume that the “emergency measures” were temporary and necessary means to halt a grain 
crisis, and so did not oppose Stalin‟s initiatives in the countryside. It can therefore be 
suggested that the lack of record of the Right deviation in Kirov‟s public statements in 1928 
can be explained by the lack of public division between the Stalin group versus Bukharin‟s.  
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Even when Stalin‟s policies became more extensive in the countryside and the differences in 
opinion between the two factions became more profound, officially both factions denied each 
other‟s existence from 1928 to 1929. Formally the Party seemed to appear unified. Public 
debate was conducted in the so-called “Aesopian” or undercurrent language.139 The analysis 
of Stalin‟s speeches imply that Stalin himself did not criticise the Right deviationists in public 
in 1928 and early 1929. He acted carefully, publicly supporting unity in the party.
140
 As in the 
case with the Left Opposition from his official statements, Stalin appeared in the role of an 
advocate and moderator rather than a prosecutor. Therefore, the Party‟s wish to limit factional 
tensions to the internal discussion may explain Kirov‟s official restrained position towards the 
Right deviationists in the late 1920s.  
The gap in official statements, however, did not necessarily mean that the struggle over power 
inside the Stalin-Bukharin leadership was unknown in wider party circles.
141
 As the leader of 
such an important centre as Leningrad and a close friend of Sergo Ordzhonikidze, who was in 
the centre of then current political intrigues, Kirov was aware of the ongoing tensions in the 
top level of the party. From the letter to Maria Lvovna, dated 17 July 1928, it is known that 
Stalin visited Leningrad after the July plenum in 1928 when the Right opposition had been 
reduced to a minority status. Kirov wrote in July 1928 to his wife, “Dear Marusia, […] things 
are not working out very well. But it is useless to talk about it. Stalin was here with me for 
two or three days. The day before yesterday he left.”142  It may be suggested that Kirov 
acquired information about the strife between Stalin and his Right opponents at first hand. 
Unfortunately, Kirov‟s private letters do not reveal his personal attitude towards the Rightists 
in 1928. Kirov seemed rather reserved and precautionary in expressing his views in the letters. 
Kirov‟s letter to Ordzhonikidze that was sent the same day as the letter to Maria Lvovna in 
July 1928, did not include more information about the political strife either: “You have 
already been told about the plenum. After the plenum Stalin was here in Leningrad... Things 
are generally in order... [I will tell you] about the rest when we meet, which I hope will be 
soon”. 143  Personal correspondence between Kirov and Ordzhonikidze does not directly 
convey Kirov‟s view of the Rightists, but they indicate the ongoing discussions of the current 
situation privately. The lack of Kirov‟s private thoughts about the campaign against the 
Rightists has left space for speculations by historians.    
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It seems to me that Kirov‟s reserved position towards the Rightists was dictated by a 
generally unclear situation within the Party. Not only Kirov, but some other high-ranking 
Communists did not know how to relate to the conflict in the top and to decide whose side to 
choose. The Rightists had good personal relationships with many members of the Politburo, 
with whom they had shared years of merciless struggle against a common enemy, the 
Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition.
144
 Hence, one of the factors that distinguished the campaign 
against the Rightists from the one against the Leftists was that even Stalin‟s supporters did not 
view the Bukharin group the same way they had viewed previous opposition forces, such as 
Trotsky and Zinoviev. The Rightists were not viewed as an organized opposition group that is 
why they were labelled as a deviation. Moreover, they were less inflexible than the Leftists 
and tried to act within the party framework of party legality by not making categorical 
demands about Politburo staffing changes.
145
 Even during the bitter conflict, Bukharin, Rykov 
and Tomsky tended to be viewed as “one of us”. This fact may illustrate both the cautious 
positions of the Politburo members towards the Bukharin group as well as their sympathies 
towards it. Kirov was among those who managed to preserve friendly relations with the Right 
leaders. In Kirov‟s file at the RGASPI archive, there are personal notes written with pencil 
about the Right opposition most likely dating from 1929. Despite the bad quality of the 
document, the information in the source indicates that Kirov disliked the conflict with the 
Rightists, “About factionalism. Did not exist. Maybe the correct opposition. Hidden struggle 
in the party. I have to fight Tomsky and vice versa?”146 
Personal correspondence between Kirov and Bukharin indicates generally warm and friendly 
relationship between the two Bolsheviks. They were not as close as Kirov and Ordzhonikidze 
for instance, but the letters reveal the fact that Kirov highly respected Bukharin. There is a 
variety of messages in the correspondence between them, such as general mundane matters 
and sharing of opinions about books and magazines.
147
 Other than personal matters, there is 
no assessment of either Stalin, or of the political situation in the Soviet Union. Aside from the 
existing letters, it is a known fact that whenever Bukharin was in Leningrad he preferred to 
stay at the Kirov‟s flat.148 Bukharin‟s reminiscences that are kept at the President archive in 
Russia imply that even when Bukharin was in Stalin‟s disfavour in the 1930s he kept a close 
relationship with Kirov: “When I was in disfavour... and fell ill in Leningrad, Kirov came to 
me, spent the entire day, muffled me up and sent me to Moscow with such affectionate 
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care.”149 In one of the recollections found by Kirilina in Kirov‟s museum in St. Petersburg, it 
is noted that Kirov never believed that Bukharin was a deviator and worried every time they 
had disagreements.
150
 Therefore it is understandable that Kirov was frustrated by the fact that 
he had to fight those he actually highly valued personally. As a result, Kirov‟s reserved 
attitude towards the Right wing leaders could be explained by the good personal relationship 
with Bukharin. However, friendly relationship with Bukharin did not necessarily place Kirov 
on the same side with Bukharin politically. This fact will be analysed in the discussion of 
Kirov‟s economic points of view.   
As previously mentioned, Kirov‟s good relationship with the Right leaders did not distinguish 
itself among other high-ranking Communists. Ordzhonikidze, Voroshilov and Kalinin were 
also careful regarding their statements towards Bukharin and the Rightists in the end of the 
1920s.
151
 It has been agreed upon that despite Ordzhonikidze‟s close relationship with Stalin, 
his attitude towards the Rightists was rather conciliatory in nature towards the end of the 
twenties. The question is whether Kirov‟s association with Ordzhonikidze may imply of a 
similar wavering position towards the Rightists.  
From analysing the first-hand sources, such as letters and his official statements, it seems that 
Ordzhonikidze‟s position as a vacillator is sometimes exaggerated. On the one hand, in a 
letter to Rykov in November 1928, Ordzhonikidze really tried to reconcile Stalin with the 
Rightists:  
I am begging you to try to reconcile Bukharin and Stalin [...] It is ridiculous, of course, to talk about 
replacing you, or Bukharin, or Tomsky. That would be crazy. It appears that the relationship between 
Stalin and Bukharin has significantly deteriorated, but we have to do everything we can to reconcile 
them. In general, Aleksei, we have to be incredibly careful in dealing with any issues that could 
trigger a fistfight. The greatest restraint is needed to keep a fight from breaking out.
152
 
Like Kirov, Ordzhonikidze was also frustrated by the internal party disagreements. 
Ordzhonikidze‟s motive in reconciling with the Rightists was to preserve the status quo in the 
Politburo and to avoid further conflicts which could undermine the Socialist order in the 
Soviet Union.
153
 Besides, in the letter to Kirov on 29 July 1929 Ordzhonikidze wrote, “The 
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opposition has never failed as quickly and as disgracefully as it happened with the Right 
fellows. To hell with them let us not regret.”154  
It is interesting that when Bukharin sought support from Kamenev and the earlier Left 
Opposition against Stalin in 1928, he mentioned that the Rightists originally relied on the 
support of Ordzhonikidze: “Ordzhonikidze is not a knight. He came to me, cursed Stalin 
violently, but in the decisive moment betrayed us.”155 The conversation between Bukharin 
and Kamenev provided Stalin with a reason to accuse Bukharin and the Rightists of disloyalty 
to the party. As for Ordzhonikidze, he was appointed as the chairman of the special 
commission to decide the question of the Bukharin-Kamenev conversation, where Kirov was 
also a member. The appointment of Ordzhonikidze as a chairman may demonstrate the fact 
that the party itself did not attach significant importance to Bukharin‟s statements about 
Ordzhonikidze. Nevertheless, it seems that Kirov could have had a rather similar position 
towards the Rightists to that of Ordzhonikidze. Due to his tolerant personality, Kirov might 
have tried to avoid further conflict within the party and preserve the existing order within the 
Politburo.  
The antagonists in the factional conflict were officially identified during the April CC plenum, 
held in April 1929.
156
 Stalin personally brought up the issue of the expulsion of the Rightists 
from their posts: 
Bukharin and Tomsky must be removed from their posts and warned that in the event of the slightest 
attempt at insubordination to the decisions of the Central Committee, the latter will be forced to 
exclude both of them from the Politburo.
157
 
Nevertheless, Kirov still seemed to be rather reserved in his position towards the Rightists. 
From the analysis of Kirov‟s official statements after April 1929, it is evident that Kirov 
began to condemn the Rightist‟s position openly only in September 1929. The appearance of 
criticism in Kirov‟s official statements could be caused by an article which was published in 
the central newspaper Pravda in September 1929 criticising Kirov‟s position towards the 
Rightists.  
PRAVDA
158
 ABOUT LENINGRAD 
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In a September issue of the Pravda in 1932, while Kirov was hunting outside Leningrad, the 
Leningrad organisation was criticised in a number of articles for suppression of “self- 
criticism”. The so-called “self-criticism campaign”, samokritika, had been encouraged by 
Moscow and Stalin, who was personally against potential oppositionists since the April 
plenum in 1928.
159
 The allegations in the Pravda represented serious charges against the 
Leningrad government and Kirov, personally, since the aim of the self criticism campaign 
was to mobilise party members and the masses to reveal the “ideologically mistaken”. By 
ideologically mistaken it means those who were critical of the general policies. The campaign 
was aimed to avoid organisation of those “ideologically mistaken” into factions. Therefore the 
Leningrad organisation was basically accused of not following the general line, or Stalin‟s 
policies. 
In addition to the articles in the Pravda a group of Leningrad officials led by Georgy Desov 
and Konstantin Yunosov sent a letter to the Presidium of the CC where they blamed the 
Leningrad party organisation and Kirov personally for the containment of the self-criticism 
campaign and moderation towards the oppositionists. As it occurred later, Desov and 
Yunosov even demanded of the Moscow officials to remove Kirov from his post in 
Leningrad. Desov and Yunosov were experienced Bolsheviks since 1905 and did not adhere 
to Oppositionists. Those charges were made on the grounds of Kirov‟s pre-revolutionary 
work for the liberal newspaper in Terek and not leading consistent enough work against the 
Oppositionists by hiring many specialists with the background of financiers and factory 
owners.
160
 The accusations of Kirov occurred not unsubstantiated by Desov and Yunosov. 
Some of the Zinoviev‟s followers that were exiled after the Fourteenth Party Congress were in 
fact allowed to return to Leningrad after accepting the general line and writing repentant 
letters.
161
 However, they were allowed back to Leningrad not on Kirov‟s personal initiative, 
but due to their re-admission into the Party in June 1928.  
After reading the articles, Kirov returned to Leningrad at once and on 2 September called for 
the local party committee meeting. The resolution was passed saying that the commissions 
should investigate the charges against the Leningrad organisation. Unfortunately, there were 
no reports from that meeting and one cannot discuss Kirov‟s reaction to the situation, but it 
could be assumed that he was nervous and upset about the allegations. Regardless of Kirov‟s 
personal views of the articles, this incident is very interesting regarding the analysis of 
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Kirov‟s position towards the Rightists. As noticed by Amy Knight, Uglanov, a Moscow 
Secretary, who adhered to the Right faction, like Kirov was also levelled with the suppression 
of criticism a year earlier.
162
 Such parallels with Uglanov and the Moscow organization do 
not imply that Kirov was considered to be an advocate of the Right policies, but the incident 
could entail Kirov‟s vacillating position in the conflict between the two factions. In that 
respect, it is interesting to discuss Stalin‟s position and role in the happenings in Leningrad. 
Stalin was holidaying in the South when the articles appeared. He was met with the situation 
through the newspapers and his correspondences with his wife Nadezhda Allilueva, Molotov 
and Ordzhonikidze.
163
 In one of the letters to Molotov and Ordzhonikidze on 13 September 
1929 he wrote: 
The article in Pravda attacking the Leningrad leadership was a grave error. Someone wanted to 
portray the top officials in Leningrad as opposing the correction of the shortcomings (that‟s not 
true!)... They forgot that the Leningrad organization, which represents the most reliable bulwark of the 
CC, is a blow to the very heart of the Central Committee...
164
  
From Stalin‟s private correspondence, it may be concluded that Stalin did not seem to 
question Kirov‟s loyalty to him and he described the situation as unfair. Due to Stalin‟s 
support of Kirov during the discussion of the matter at a closed joint session of the Politburo 
and the Central Control Commission presidium in autumn 1929, Kirov appeared a victor from 
the confrontation.
165
 Although Kirov‟s pre-revolutionary activities were characterised as an 
error, his opponents were fired from their posts in Leningrad. Therefore the party and Stalin 
supported Kirov in the confrontation. On the one hand, Stalin‟s role and reaction towards the 
accusations against Kirov demonstrated good relationship between Stalin and Kirov. At the 
same time it should be noted that Stalin‟s reaction could be interpreted in terms of the 
political game. Since Kirov was perceived as a waverer in the Party, it was important for 
Stalin to gain Kirov‟s support against the Bukharinites.  By supporting Kirov in those events, 
Stalin acquired one more ally. Therefore Stalin simply used the circumstances in his own 
advantage and Kirov became dependent on Stalin. 
On 9 September 1929, Kirov stated in one of his speeches in Leningrad that the Right 
deviation could be fought by means of broad self-criticism: 
How [to fight the Right opposition]? It can be made only by means of broad and healthy proletarian 
self-criticism, so that the right danger will be burned out by the flames of self-criticism even in the 
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smallest establishments of our Party. Since it [the opposition] is only in germinal condition, this 
danger can be warned. To be honest, the Right danger is very seductive, not only because it looks well 
ideologically, but also in practice.
166
  
Taking into consideration the events in Leningrad, it is not surprising that self-criticism was 
mentioned in that speech. Kirov approved of the cleansing campaign of the Party, noting that, 
„it was the greatest Party activity.‟167 Nonetheless, he still appeared to hold a rather reserved 
position towards the Rightists. For instance, he did not mention their expulsion as it was done 
by Stalin. He claimed that it was possible to fight the Rightists by other methods like self- 
criticism.  
After the article in the Pravda, Kirov‟s public statements became more critical towards the 
Rightists. Kirov wished to show that the Leningrad organisation was in line with the CC‟s 
resolutions. Moreover, Bukharin, Tomsky and Rykov were officially accused of similar 
charges as with the Leftist leaders. These charges included the possession of a separate 
platform and a line different from that of the CC and forming a bloc with Trotskyites.
168
 
Therefore the criticism of the Right deviation was more open to the public in general. At the 
Sixteenth Party Congress held in June 1930, Kirov criticised Rightist position: “On this stage 
of socialist building we consider the Right deviation as the main danger. That is why we will 
lead even firmer struggle against the Right deviationists...We have to firmly, decisively and 
irreversibly finish with the Right deviation.”169 At the same time, during the local meeting 
about the results of the Sixteenth Party Congress, Kirov argued for keeping Bukharin in the 
CC of the party: 
It is more profitable to keep Bukharin in the CC of the party. It is a known fact that none of the Right 
opposition leaders represent a threat to the party. If any of them tried to arm up against the General 
Line, they would be brought ruthlessly down. We have decided that Bukharin is not an ordinary 
member of the party despite his instability. We should bustle about helping him to readjust his 
mistakes. If he still sustains his view we will draw appropriate conclusions at the closest plenum.
170
 
Nevertheless, by the early 1930s Kirov became more open towards criticism of the Rightists. 
In his speeches he condemned their position as wrong and incorrect. It is, however, 
questionable as to whether Kirov‟s restricted criticism was only due to personal sympathies 
with the leaders of the Right deviation or whether he also favoured their ideological strategy 
rather than Stalin‟s.  
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Stalin‟s fiftieth birthday in December 1929 occupied a special place in the formation of his 
cult of personality after the defeat of the Rightists. It was a major public event when all of 
Stalin‟s associates glorified their established leader. Like the rest of the high-ranking 
Communists, Kirov glorified Stalin at the local meeting in Leningrad on 17 December 1929: 
It is Stalin who directly and staunchly defended the principles of Leninism in our Party. It should be 
said that since Stalin has taken the leading role in the Central Committee, the work of our party has 
undoubtedly has grown stronger. So, let our Party proceed to the victory under the leadership of this 
tried, stern and solid leadership.
171
  
Although his speech was not published in the special collection of speeches, published in 
honour of Stalin at the end of 1929, Kirov attended the celebrations for Stalin in Moscow on 
21 December.  
INDUSTRIALISATION PLAN 
It has been suggested that Kirov‟s views on economic policy were more in tune with those of 
Bukharin than those of Stalin. Apparently, Kirov assessed Stalin‟s tempos for industrialisation 
of the Leningrad region as unrealistic.
172
 The Party pursued a policy of industrialisation of the 
Soviet Union after the Fourteenth Party Congress, held in late 1925. In his speeches delivered 
in the middle of the 1920s, Kirov shared Stalin‟s optimism for the industrialisation. In line 
with the rest of the Party leadership, he suggested that industrialisation of the Soviet Union 
was the major way in which it could overcome its backwardness and economic dependence 
on capitalist states. In May 1926, he stated, „If we do not possess highly developed 
industrialisation, then we should forget about Socialism.‟173 He also declared that, „denying 
industrialisation is denying Socialism.‟ 174  Kirov was particularly enthusiastic about 
industrialisation of Leningrad. He argued that it was necessary to industrialise Leningrad as it 
represented the seventh part of all the Soviet industry and because of its dangerously strategic 
position.
175
 From his early days in Leningrad, Kirov often noted Leningrad‟s special role in 
the industrialisation process of the Soviet Union: “Since we take our course towards 
industrialisation of our country... we should focus our attention on the main centres of heavy 
industry, Leningrad occupies the leading position in the Soviet Union in that respect.”176 
Leningrad had represented historically an important industrial centre. Mechanical 
engineering, metal working, electro technical and chemical industries represented one of the 
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most developed branches of the Soviet industry. The Leningrad region was somewhat 
industrialised already during the Czarist time.
177
 Perhaps that is why expectations from 
industrialisation of Leningrad were rather high. According to the directives of the first Five 
Year Plan the real gross output of Leningrad industry was to increase by 276 percent in the 
following five years.
178
 Although Kirov favoured industrialisation in general, allegedly he 
was rather reserved towards the projected plan for the Leningrad region. However, no sign of 
opposition to the accelerated pace for industrialisation has been found in the existing archival 
documentation. Officially Kirov defended the intensive tempos for industrialisation: 
Why do we not decrease the rate to fifteen or even twenty percent? Not only Gosplan or CC or 
Politburo are responsible for a twenty percent rate, but also the entire situation we are in now. We 
have decided not only to catch up with the capitalist countries, but to overtake them. ...High rates 
for industrialisation are dictated also by internal conditions. If we seriously re-equip agriculture 
with the basis on modern technology, it is necessary to speed up industrialisation. We cannot make 
a pause no matter how difficult it may be, what sacrifices are needed from the working class and 
peasants. We have to pursue the fastest, highest possible tempo in our conditions.
179
 
Kirov showed, however, some frustration towards the local budget in Leningrad. In his speech 
in January 1928, Kirov complained that Leningrad‟s budget was thrice as small as during the 
Czarist time.
180
 Allegedly, the industrialisation of the Leningrad region proceeded in a slower 
tempo than the rest of the central regions. Slower pace of industrialisation of the Leningrad 
region has lead to the conclusions of Kirov‟s signs of opposition to Stalin‟s policies. 
Nevertheless, the originally slower race of implementation of industrialisation may be 
explained by local difficulties of the Leningrad region, rather than conscious opposition of 
Kirov to Stalin‟s industrialisation plan.  
It should be considered that different parts of the Soviet Union had different demographic 
structures, economic profiles, geographical and climatic conditions, as well as varying levels 
of facilities and services. As a result, there was a general diversity between needs and 
demands of different provinces.
181
 Moreover, levels of development varied widely. Some 
regions were highly industrialised, whereas other provinces had barely any industry at all. 
This sort of variety between the regions created different economic profiles and premises for 
implementation of industrialisation. Leningrad was, it would seem, unprepared for its leading 
economic role in the Soviet Union. The economic situation of Leningrad industry was 
somewhat unbalanced in 1926, when Kirov became the leader of the regional party, and its 
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industry was in need of specialisation and systematic renewal.
182
 There were not enough 
skilled workers, technicians and engineers and the Leningrad region did not have enough 
local resources to finance the construction of plants.
183
 Additionally, the city was receiving 
only a third of the fuel supplies necessary to run its factories.
184
 Industrial enterprises in 
Leningrad were in need of metal, energy and fuel and financial support. Local circumstances 
could have decelerated the process of industrialisation of the Leningrad region. Nevertheless, 
despite local challenges towards industrialisation in 1930, Kirov noted that Leningrad 
industry had excelled the five year plan by increasing production by three percent more than 
planned.
185
 Therefore despite its challenges the Leningrad region, like the rest of the Soviet 
Union, still managed to industrialise in four years rather than the projected five. The 
construction of the mill in nine months, apparently a world record, at the Izhora factory may 
be used as an example of Leningrad‟s attempts to keep up the pace set for Leningrad.186 Kirov 
demonstrated himself as a loyal supporter of Stalin‟s industrialisation policies in the 
Leningrad region. 
VIEWS ON COLLECTIVISATION  
Kirov‟s views on collectivisation were allegedly different from Stalin‟s. On the basis of the 
relatively moderate collectivisation results in the Leningrad regions, scholars conclude that 
Kirov opposed Stalin‟s collectivisation policies. It has been suggested that Kirov‟s views on 
collectivisation were closer to those of Bukharin than Stalin.
187
 There is principally no record 
of Kirov‟s private thoughts about collectivisation in the archival documentation. In his 
speeches, like many other high ranking Communists, Kirov seemed to attach significant 
importance to finding the correct solution to the agrarian question.  In one of his speeches 
delivered in March 1926, Kirov referred to Lenin saying that, “if we manage to find a correct 
solution to the peasant question, if we manage to settle right relations between the working 
class and peasantry, then the revolution is secured, even on the international scale.”188 As it 
has been mentioned earlier Kirov favoured Lenin‟s vision of the gradual and voluntary 
joining of peasants into collectives. Whereas Bukharin and his Right supporters insisted on 
the continuation of the NEP in the late 1920s, Stalin, on the other hand, advanced a more 
aggressive strategy in dealing with peasantry. Stalin‟s policies in the countryside resulted in a 
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forceful comprehensive collectivisation of the peasants, which caused campaigns against the 
relatively wealthier peasants the kulaks. Any resistance to the agricultural policies was 
attributed to “kulak sabotage” and was met by deportation to Siberia, arrest or execution.189 
As a result of the collectivisation campaign hundreds of thousands of peasant families were 
deprived of their land and property and the Soviet Union was plunged into a state of civil war.  
When the majority of the Party supported Lenin‟s NEP in the middle of the 1920s, Kirov 
presented himself as an unconditional supporter of the smychka, the peaceful union with the 
peasants. In the middle of the struggle against the Left Opposition in 1926, like the rest of 
Stalin‟s supporters, Kirov implied in one of his speeches that he did not approve of using 
oppressive methods in dealing with wealthier peasants, the kulaks: “With the assistance of this 
union [smychka] and having a whole range of state levers, such as tax system, the party may 
bridle kulaks without resorting to such rude methods as dekulakisation.”190 Apparently, even 
in the first half of 1929 Kirov still emphasised the importance of giving economic assistance 
to the countryside rather than using force.
191
 Such statements contributed to conclusions about 
Kirov‟s liberalism towards peasants. 
Taken out of the general context, such statements could indicate Kirov‟s temperance towards 
the peasants. However, not only Kirov, but Stalin and the party leadership were quite cautious 
in their official statements regarding collectivisation in the early 1929. It may be claimed that 
there was no universal agreement within the party on the regulations of collectivisation in the 
first half of 1929.
 
Local leaders launched the establishment of collective farms on a mass 
scale officially at the end of 1929 and beginning of 1930.
192
 For instance, similar to Kirov 
Ordzhonikidze was also rather cautious towards collectivisation in 1929 in his speeches: 
“Peasantry should be persuaded by the examples of tractor stations, kolkhozy and sovkhozy. 
Peasantry should be pulled to our side by means of persuasion, by teaching about the 
advantages of collectivised agriculture rather than individual farming.”193 It is for this reason 
that officially not only Kirov but other Communists were careful in their statements towards 
the peasants. Stalin‟s policy of the elimination of the kulaks as a class was not announced 
until the autumn of 1929. Even then the terms for dekulakisation were quite vague. The 
decision of the kulak policy was formalised as late at 30 January 1930 in a resolution entitled 
                                                     
189
 Oleg Khlevniuk, Master of the House. Stalin and his inner Circle, 2009, 8. 
190
 RGASPI F.80, op.10, d.2, l.55. 
191
 Amy Knight, Who Killed Kirov? The Kremlin’s Greatest Mystery, 1999, 145. 
192
 R.W. Davies, Oleg V. Khlevniuk, E.A. Rees, The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence 1931-36, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2003), 4. 
193
 Sergo Ordzhonikidze, Stati i rechi, volume 2, (Moscow, 1957), 174. 
CHAPTER 4 UNIVERSITY OF OSLO MARIA DIKOVA 
51 
 
“On measures for the elimination of kulak households in districts of comprehensive 
collectivisation”.194 According to this resolution the kulaks were officially divided into three 
categories either to be shot or imprisoned, exiled to Siberia, the North, the Urals or 
Kazakhstan or to be used in labour colonies. The decrees that were issued in the late January 
caused extreme dekulakisation campaigns in the regions during the winter of 1929 to 1930. 
When the general line of the Party changed towards more direct aggression towards kulaks, 
Kirov, like other Stalinists, also blamed the kulaks for slowing down the process of building 
socialism in the Soviet Union.
195
 Like other Stalinists, he also inclined that it was necessary to 
„undress the kulaks economically.‟196  
From January 1930 Kirov did not show any signs of “moderation” towards kulaks in his 
speeches. In January 1930 at the local Leningrad meeting, Kirov noted that, “they [the 
Communists] did not have any necessity to throw those kulaks in the Neva River ... however 
if there are needed measures of suppression of the kulaks, not only as an economic category, 
but physically, they did not have to be modest in anything, even sending to the Solovetsky 
monastery.”197 This statement is in concord with the resolutions of the centre. Not only Kirov, 
but also other local Party secretaries expressed views on the necessity of applying sharp 
measures in dealing with the kulaks.
198
 Moreover, in 1932 in the article published in the 
central newspaper the Pravda Kirov exclaimed that the Party‟s punitive measures were too 
liberal:  
We have to admit honestly that our punitive policy is very liberal. We have to make amendments. 
If we unfairly judge some embezzler, then we must understand that we are dealing with people 
[liudishki] who can adapt to any situation, they usually are very quickly released under an 
amnesty, and it‟s as if there never was any trial. We must strengthen our punitive measures. We 
consider cooperative kolkhoz property as belonging to society. It seems to me that the time has 
arrived to raise kolkhoz and cooperatives to the level of governmental agencies and if someone is 
caught stealing kolkhoz or cooperative property, he should be subjected to the harshest measures. 
If the punishment is softened, then it should be to no fewer than ten years of imprisonment.
199
 
In this article, Kirov revealed himself as a supporter of harsh methods. Additionally, Kirov 
participated in the drafting of the programme of collectivisation. The commission included 
the party secretaries of all the main grain regions.
200
 Further aggressive measures upon the 
kulaks were adopted in the Politburo as a result of the propositions originated from the 
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commission members. As a member of the commission, Kirov was in fact responsible for the 
dekulakisation policy itself.  
Kirov‟s statements were a reflection of the developments in the centre. Nevertheless, one 
should not ignore the fact that it was necessary for the Communist elite to maintain a unified 
rhetorical affirmation of power and solidarity in public.
201
 Therefore it was not surprising that 
Kirov acted in total union with the party‟s majority. In reality, collectivisation in Leningrad 
allegedly proceeded slower than in other regions of the Soviet Union. For example, per 20 
February 1930, seventy percent of households were collectivised in Moscow, whereas in the 
Leningrad region this was only twenty-eight percent.
202
 Results of the collectivisation process 
in the Leningrad region presented in an internal document, labelled “secretly to Kirov”, 
reveals the collectivisation results in Leningrad: 
 1.01.1931 1.01.1932 1.01.1933 1.01.1934 1.10.1034 
Number of 
collectivised 
farms 
46.952 286.671 288.559 328.370 379.058 
% 
collectivisation 
6.6 45.1 45.4 54.2 65.7 
Table 1: Collectivisation results in the Leningrad region.
203
 
From this note, it is seen that collectivisation proceeded rather gradually. There is little 
differentiation between the annual results. The statistical data showed that the Leningrad 
province had made little progress in collectivisation by 1934. The collectivisation percentage 
was relatively modest. Actually, as noted in the internal report to Kirov, the Leningrad region 
did not entirely achieve comprehensive collectivisation by 1934.
204
 The question is what 
could cause the moderate collectivisation rate in the Leningrad region? Was it due to Kirov‟s 
personal persuasions that collectivisation should happen voluntarily, or were there other 
factors that could influence the collectivisation pace?  
Leningrad‟s slower performance in collectivisation could be explained by specific socio-
economic factors in Leningrad. As a regional party leader of Leningrad, Kirov tried to fulfil 
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orders initiated from the centre, but collectivisation was complicated by the specific 
developments in the Leningrad region. For instance, in comparison with other regions, the 
Leningrad region was rather heterogeneous in terms of natural conditions. There was only 
11.6 percent of arable land. The rest of the territory was covered with forest and marsh. This 
fact complicated the use of machinery, in contrast with the North Caucasus and the Ukraine, 
for example. Alongside agricultural flax cultivation, stock-raising and gardening, there were 
also regions occupied with hunting and fishing.
205
 Besides, almost forty-two percent of the 
population was occupied with seasonal work, which also complicated the collectivisation 
process.
206
  The collectivisation in the Leningrad region was also challenged by the fact that 
the prevailing number of the peasant households belonged to poor peasants, or bedniaki. 
According to the statistics fifty-eight percent of all households in the Leningrad Province 
belonged to poor peasants and small farms, more than forty percent of the households 
belonged to middle peasants, or seredniak, and only two percent were the kulak farms. One of 
the main reasons for delay in collectivisation in the Leningrad region was the fact that small 
households did not have an opportunity to use machines and expand their production.
207
 Poor 
peasants had considerable opportunities to work as otkhodniki, a migrant worker, and in other 
non agricultural activities. Therefore there was little incentive to join the kolkhozy.
208
 In 
addition to that, the party organisations in the region were rather weak, which also 
complicated the collectivisation process.
209
 Moderate rate of collectivisation was dictated by 
the specific factors in the Leningrad region. Kirov did not try to conceal Leningrad‟s modest 
performance in collectivisation, as seen in 1931 when he stated: 
Collectivisation may be considered completed in the key grain regions. Eighty percent of the peasant 
farms and more than ninety percent of areas under crops have been collectivised. Even in our 
Leningrad region, where collectivisation proceeded under more moderate rate, than in the grain 
regions, the collective sector embraces more than one third of all peasant farms and forty percent of 
sowing. If there were only 1.4% peasant farms by 1 October 1929, then today we have already 35%.
210
 
Stalin was also aware of Leningrad‟s results in collectivisation. In 1932, Kirov received two 
telegrams from Stalin. In the first, he demanded to fulfil collectivisation of the Leningrad 
region in 1932, and in the second he extended the period to the end of 1933.
211
 Apparently, 
between the two telegrams Kirov persuaded Stalin to expand the period.  
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As in the rest of the Soviet regions, the collectivisation campaign was met with upheavals in 
the Leningrad countryside. In 1928, there were a registered 212 cases of peasant rebellions 
and during two months in 1929 there were more than one hundred riots registered.
 212 
Amy 
Knight claimed that the collectivisation of the Leningrad region was conducted with less 
ruthlessness and brute force than in other regions.
213
 From her analysis, Kirov appeared as a 
“moderate” regarding the degree of terror with which the process was carried out in 
Leningrad. It should be noted that the drive against the kulaks reached its height during the 
winter of 1930. Statistics that were introduced in the later years do not suggest any 
moderation towards the kulaks in the Leningrad regions during that winter. For instance, in 
one of the districts, raion, in the Leningrad region, in only three weeks in February 1930 the 
percentage of collectivisation increased from 17-18% to 90-92 %.
214
 The state terror in the 
area under Kirov‟s authority was no less severe than in the Soviet Union overall. Perhaps the 
degree of terror was even more severe taking into consideration that the population of 
Leningrad Province in 1932 constituted 4.2 percent of the entire Soviet population, and thirty-
seven thousand people were arrested in Leningrad Province, representing approximately nine 
percent of all the secret police agency (OGPU) arrests in the Soviet Union.
215
 In the archival 
documentation, there are several examples of proposals to limit pressure on the kulaks. For 
instance, in spring 1932 Mikhail Kalinin, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee, 
objected the deportation of kulaks that had been expelled from kolkhozes.
216
 As a result of 
Kalinin‟s protest, the Politburo stopped the deportation of thirty-eight thousand kulak 
households. However, no similar objection can be found on the behalf of Kirov. 
On the other hand, the implementation of the collectivisation campaign was more complex 
than sometimes interpreted. It is probably not exactly accurate to attribute this repression only 
to Kirov entirely. Kirov‟s involvement in the dekulakisation campaign may be interpreted 
from two perspectives. According to the perspective from above, excessive tempos in 
collectivisation were set by the CC. Therefore agricultural collectivisation involved 
continuing central pressures on the lower level party leaders. The achievement of the goals 
dictated from above was of prevailing importance, despite the appearing obstacles from 
below.
217
 It was for this reason that lower level party leaders were thus caught between two 
unremitting forces: the opposition of dispossessed peasants from below, and the excessive 
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demands for performance by the central leaders from above.
218
 From this perspective, Kirov 
followed the orders dictated from the centre in Leningrad. On the other hand, Kirov was 
personally responsible for the terror in Leningrad as a representative of the central authorities. 
Local officials had become responsible for the organisation of collectivisation in their 
territories.
219
 
The expropriation of the kulaks was unplanned, unsystematic and, at times, even chaotic. 
Later research has shown that the directives from the centre upon the dekulakisation were 
often vague and unclear. The centre did not exert control over the dekulakisation campaign in 
the regions. Results in the regions exceeded the initial demands from the centre due to the 
anarchic nature of the drive against the kulaks.
220
 As a regional leader, Kirov was directly in 
charge of the high rates of the kulak victims in the Leningrad province.  On the other hand, in 
most regions of the country, lower authorities at the okrug and raion level were allowed to set 
their own numerical quotas for the number of peasant households to be dekulised.
221
 
Therefore the collectivisation process was out of control due to the initiative of local leaders.  
As a leader of the Leningrad region, Kirov should have been aware of the increasing statistics 
in the countryside during the winter of 1930 and, in case of his moderation, should have 
detained the process. In one of his speeches in March 1930, Kirov actually warned „against 
chasing the percentage‟ and in another speech he criticised the use of repressive methods and 
rather preferred voluntary joining of the peasants.
222
 Amy Knight interpreted those statements 
by Kirov as a sign of his opposition to the collectivisation campaign. However, Kirov‟s 
statements appeared as a result of Stalin‟s infamous speech  
“Dizzy with Success”, delivered in the beginning of March 1930. In that speech Stalin 
criticised local authorities for excessive results in collectivisation. Therefore considered in the 
light of Stalin‟s speech, Kirov‟s statements in March 1930 were not the sign of his 
moderation, but rather a reply to Stalin‟s criticism. Despite Leningrad‟s moderate results in 
collectivisation, there is no sign of opposition on Kirov‟s behalf towards the agricultural 
policies.   
Kirov also participated in the “passportisation” of the Soviet Union in December 1932. 
Everyone who did not receive a new passport, were evicted from their flats as well as the city 
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within one day. One hundred thousand people, including representatives of the bourgeoisie, 
clergy, and officers were evicted from Leningrad.
223
 Moreover, Kirov actively participated in 
the construction of the Baltic-White Sea Canal, Belomorkanal, which connected the White 
Sea with Lake Onega in Leningrad, which further connected with the Baltic Sea.  The canal 
was constructed within twenty months using prison camp labour, at great human cost. The 
construction was primarily controlled by the secret police, but as the party chief of Leningrad 
Kirov took an active supervising role. Although there is a record that on Kirov‟s personal 
initiation for good work, the working prisoners were rewarded and sometimes even released 
before the scheduled time, he was aware of the harsh methods employed by the secret 
police.
224
  Furthermore, Kirov seemed to attach significant importance to the construction of 
the canal. For instance, at the Seventeenth Party Congress held in December 1934, Kirov 
declared:  
It [the Belomorkanal] was a giant construction of our epoch... It was a heroic act to build such a 
canal in such a short period of time...we have to render justice to our Chekists, [secret police 
officers], who directed the construction and who literally achieved a miracle.
225
  
From this statement it is evident that Kirov was proud of the construction of the canal under 
his authority. Moreover, all the delegates of Seventeenth Party Congress received copies of 
the book The Stalin Baltic-White Sea Canal, which Kirov called a „very useful book‟.226 
CONCLUSION 
Kirov‟s reserved position towards Bukharin and the Right Deviation, relatively moderate 
results of collectivisation of the Leningrad region, and Kirov‟s alleged scepticism towards the 
first draft of the industrialisation plan have led to conclusions that Kirov impeded the 
implementation of Stalin‟s policies. Nevertheless, it is arguable whether Kirov‟s ambivalence 
was caused by his independent position in the party, or by some other explanatory factors. It 
has been shown that Kirov‟s hesitant position towards the Rightists may be explained by a 
generally uncertain and complex political situation around the Rightists‟ position. It was not 
only Kirov who was reserved towards criticising the Right Opposition, but also the rest of the 
party members who devotedly supported Stalin. Therefore, Kirov‟s reserved position towards 
the Rightists was similar to those of the rest of the Stalinists between 1928 and 1929. As for 
Stalin‟s reforms of collectivisation, judging from Kirov‟s official statements throughout the 
Leningrad period his vision of agricultural policies, by and large, seemed to change in line 
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with the developments on top of the Communist Party. He was reserved towards 
collectivisation when there was general uncertainty on the top of the party leadership and he 
became more radical in his statements when the party advanced harsher methods. Moderate 
results of the collectivisation of the Leningrad region may be explained by local unfavourable 
conditions for collectivisation rather than Kirov‟s independent position towards the policy 
itself. Moreover, as it has been shown, the collectivisation of the Leningrad region was no less 
severe, perhaps even more severe, than in other regions of the Soviet Union. It may be 
concluded that Kirov‟s position in the campaign against the Rightists, as well as his role 
regarding Stalin‟s policies, reveals him as a rather cautious politician. He tried to avoid being 
in the centre of political struggle. Perhaps his indecisiveness and carefulness have led to 
conclusions about his alternative position within the Soviet leadership.   
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CHAPTER 5: STALIN’S FRIEND OR FOE? 
SERGEI KIROV: LEADER OF A “MODERATE” COURSE? 
INTRODUCTION  
There were several signs of a certain relaxation of policies by 1934 in the Soviet Union: 
former oppositionists were admitted back into the Party, there was a decrease in peasant 
deportations, and those who had been sent to labour camps in connection with collectivisation 
were released. The Soviet administration, furthermore, reduced the grain procurement plan in 
1932 and 1933, and agreed on slower targets for the Second Five Year Plan (1933 to 1937).
227
 
There is an assumption that the sudden shift of the official policy was a result of a concealed 
intra-party struggle between the “moderates”, allegedly represented by Kirov, and the 
“radicals”, typified by Stalin. Kirov‟s popularity became so strong within the Soviet 
leadership and among the masses that he advanced an independent set of reforms based on 
relaxation of administrative pressure. It is questionable, however, whether the softening of the 
policies was caused by personal initiative from Kirov. His political position in the period 
between 1931 and 1934 may provide an answer as to whether relative relaxation of the 
policies in the early 1930s was initiated by him, or whether there were other factors that 
contributed to the shift in the official line.  
THE RIUTIN AFFAIR 
The theory that Kirov presented a new liberal course in the 1930s originated from the article 
entitled the „Letter of an Old Bolshevik‟, written by Boris Nicolaevsky, a Menshevik in exile. 
The article was published anonymously abroad in the Socialist Herald in January 1937. In 
1956 he acclaimed his authorship in another article entitled „Murder of Kirov‟. Nicolaevsky 
presented Kirov as an initiator of a “new line” of moderation and abolition of the terror in the 
early 1930s. As a head of the “moderates”, represented by other regional secretaries, Kirov 
presumably advocated a new set of reforms based on an end of official terror and civil strife, 
and reconciliation with the population and with former oppositionists inside the party.
228
 
Nicolaevsky claimed that the first sign of opposition to Stalin became apparent during the 
discussion of the fate of an oppositionist, Martemian Riutin, in autumn 1932. He stated, “The 
extraordinary popularity Kirov enjoyed in wide Party circles during the last two years of his 
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life was due to primarily to the role he had played in the Riutin‟s case”.229 Kirov‟s alleged 
central and decisive role over the fate of Riutin has been used as the primary evidence of 
Kirov‟s opposition to Stalin in the early 1930s. 
The Riutin platform was one of the last attempts to oppose Stalin in the early 1930s. 
Martemian Riutin, an Old Bolshevik since Lenin‟s time and a secretary of the Moscow Party 
Committee, had led oppositionist activities against Stalin and his economic policies since the 
late 1920s. Although not officially a rightist, Riutin supported Bukharin‟s policies on gradual 
collectivisation and slower rate for industrialisation. However, unlike Bukharin, Riutin did not 
accept Stalin‟s line as the official Party policy in 1929. As a consequence, he was expelled 
from the Soviet Communist party in 1930, „for an attempt for underground propagandising 
right opportunistic views.‟ 230  In 1931, Riutin resumed his opposition to Stalin and his 
economic policies even after his release from the six months‟ arrest for counter-revolutionary 
activities.  
By the spring of 1932, Riutin was responsible for drafting two documents that provoked the 
entire leadership of the Communist Party. The two documents were represented by a seven- 
page appeal, entitled „To All Members of the VKP(b)‟ (VKP(b) a Russian acronym for the 
Soviet Communist Party), and almost a two-hundred-page platform entitled „Stalin and the 
Crisis of the Proletarian Dictatorship‟, later called the Riutin platform. In those documents, 
Riutin, in alliance with his supporters in the League of Marxists-Leninists, criticised not only 
the Stalinist regime for an economic crisis in the Soviet Union, but blamed Stalin personally. 
Riutin and his supporters, who were called the Marxist-Leninists, urged every party member 
to unite in the name of the Leninist ideas in opposition to Stalin and his policies. Since the 
spring of 1932, numerous copies of the Riutin platform were distributed secretly in Moscow 
among former oppositionists, including Zinoviev and Kamenev.
231
 Eventually, by the autumn 
of 1932, Riutin and his group were arrested by the OGPU, or secret police, for counter-
revolutionary activities.   
It is quite unclear as to what actually happened after Riutin‟s arrest in 1932. Presumably the 
OGPU, on Stalin‟s behalf, demanded Riutin‟s execution for counter-revolutionary 
activities.
232
 There is a theory that because it would have been the first time that an 
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oppositionist would be given the death penalty the Riutin‟s case was considered further at a 
Politburo meeting. Allegedly, at this heated Politburo meeting in September 1932, Stalin 
favoured granting the OGPU‟s demand on Riutin‟s execution, whereas Kirov was possibly 
the first to object the request.
233
 As a result of the possible successful attempt of Kirov to 
oppose Stalin, Riutin was sentenced to ten years in prison rather than execution on 11 October 
1932. Other members of the Marxist-Leninist League were either exiled or, like Riutin, 
sentenced to prison. Kamenev and Zinoviev were expelled from the Party for the second time 
for not informing the party of the existence of the Riutin platform.
234
 Kirov‟s supposed 
opposition to Stalin in the Riutin case has been used as an acknowledged fact of the existing 
coherent resistance to Stalin under the leadership of Kirov. However, archival documentation 
recently available has questioned the theory that Kirov opposed Stalin at the Politburo 
meeting in 1932.  
There is in fact no factual record of a Politburo meeting regarding Riutin‟s case in 1932 in the 
archival documentation. It is known that Riutin‟s fate was discussed at the CC plenum on 2 
October 1932 and at the Central Control Commission presidium on 9 October 1932. 
However, there is no sign of opposition between Kirov and Stalin at either of the meetings. 
Kirov‟s signature was absent from the resolution regarding Riutin and his followers, which 
was adopted through polling of Politburo members on 10 October 1932. The final decision 
was to expel twenty-four people connected to the distribution of the Riutin‟s platform “as 
traitors to the party and the working class who attempted to create, through underground 
measures [...] a bourgeois kulak organisation to restore capitalism in the USSR.”235 Kirov‟s 
absence was not exceptional since he generally was seldom in Moscow and at the Politburo 
meetings. The investigation of the archival material in the Politburo archive, Kirov archive 
and Stalin archive did not suggest any conflict between Kirov and Stalin over Riutin‟s fate.  
One may, however, assume that Riutin‟s case was decided at a highly secretive unofficial 
meeting of the Politburo members. Khlevniuk, who has had access to many of the classified 
Politburo files, did not find any mention of the Riutin case in the special folder which 
contains other important top secret questions. He concluded that Riutin‟s case was a routine 
question, which was unlikely to be considered at an unofficial secret meeting without taking 
reports. Besides this there were no meetings where all Politburo members were gathered 
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together between 25 September and 23 October at Stalin‟s Kremlin office either.236 On the 
basis of the available sources, it seems that the conflict between Kirov and Stalin over the 
Riutin‟s assassination is a mere mystification. The question is on what basis then Nicolaevsky 
concluded that Kirov played a decisive role in the Riutin case and that it was discussed at a 
Politburo meeting. 
Nicolaevsky admitted that the information published in his articles was obtained by him in the 
private conversation with Bukharin, while Bukharin was staying in Paris in 1936. However, 
there are certain factors that question Nicolaevsky‟s articles as reliable sources. First, Anna 
Larina, Bukharin‟s widow who stayed with Bukharin in Paris in 1936, refuted the fact in her 
memoirs that Bukharin could have held any private conversations with Nicolaevsky during 
his stay in Paris. She noted that most of the conversations the two men had concerned official 
matters over the archives Bukharin needed to buy from the Mensheviks as demanded by 
Stalin. On the other hand, as noted by Larina herself and later by Robert Tucker on the basis 
of Professor Liebich‟s assumptions, Larina was not with Bukharin during half or more of his 
two month stay in Paris and could not have known about all of the meetings with 
Nicolaevsky.
237
 Additionally, Bukharin could have decided not to burden his young, pregnant 
wife with the worrying situation at home.
238
 However, Larina concluded that judging by 
Bukharin‟s mood and other conversations with her husband while in Paris, Bukharin could 
not have had conversations with a Menshevik without witnesses.  
It should be noted that Bukharin was in Paris after Kirov‟s death when the political situation 
in the Soviet Union was rather tense. Stalin seemed to become more suspicious of his closest 
circle after Kirov‟s death and therefore Bukharin was careful in Paris as to not to raise any 
unnecessary doubts in the OGPU agents placed to follow him in Paris. For instance, Bukharin 
rather enthusiastically replied to Nicolaevsky on a question about the contemporary matters in 
the Soviet Union. Larina noticed that Nicolaevsky expected a very different response and was 
unprepared for that kind of enthusiasm from Bukharin.
239
 As noted by Nicolaevsky himself, 
Bukharin was „inwardly conflicted‟ and feared to say too much.240 It is questionable whether 
Bukharin could have held private conversations with Nicolaevsky, a Menshevik whom he met 
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in Paris for the first time. It seems like Nicolaevsky‟s account was based on his personal 
impression of Bukharin in Paris.  
Moreover, the information he acquired from Bukharin was a matter of internal political 
discussions. Bukharin was excluded from the Politburo in 1929, and therefore he could not 
have been present at the alleged closed Politburo meeting in 1932. On the other hand, it could 
be claimed that Bukharin acquired information about the conflict between Kirov and Stalin 
from other Politburo members, like Ordzhonikidze for example. However, Larina stated that, 
„He [Bukharin] was isolated and had lost personal contact with Politburo members.‟ 241 
Therefore, it is questionable that Bukharin could have had knowledge about a closed session 
at all. The question is then why Nicolaevsky needed to publish an erroneous article and single 
out Kirov in opposition to Stalin.   
One of the reasons for Nicolaevsky choosing Riutin‟s case in his article may lie in the fact 
that throughout the decades the Soviet Communist Party had tried to conceal the case from 
public view. The Riutin case did not obtain much publicity during Stalin‟s time, as well as in 
the Soviet writing later in the period between 1941 and 1988. Even professional historians in 
the Soviet Union did not have broad knowledge about the Riutin case.
242
 The absence of the 
Riutin affair in the official Soviet history demonstrates the importance of Riutin‟s opposition 
to the Soviet leadership. Conquest noted that, for Stalin, the Riutin Platform was „the worst 
embodiment of everything hostile.‟243 The lack of publicity in the Soviet Union could have 
aroused suspicions about the case abroad, and therefore resulted in widespread speculations.  
However, there may be other reasons for Stalin‟s wish to conceal the case than the conflict 
with Kirov over Riutin‟s fate.  The content of the Riutin platform was a direct assault not only 
against the Party‟s policies from above, but also Stalin‟s closest circle, including Kirov. 
Riutin‟s platform included some dangerous truth about Stalin‟s regime and Stalin‟s clique, 
and that is why Stalin tried to conceal the case. Riutin wrote:  
Our opportunists were also able to adapt themselves to the Stalin regime and camouflage themselves... 
Kirov, a member of the Politburo, is a former Kadet and editor of the Kadet newspaper in 
Vladikavkaz. All of these, you could say, are the pillars of the Stalinist regime. They are all the 
ultimate opportunists. These people adapt themselves to any regime, to any political system... 
Everyone knows how the attempt by Leningraders to expose Kirov as a former Kadet and editor of the 
                                                     
241
 Anna Larina, This I cannot Forget, 1993, 262. 
242
 I.B. Shishkin, “Delo Riutina”, in Voprosy Istorii Nr.7, 1989, 39. 
243
 Robert Conquest, Stalin. Breaker of Nations, 1992, 162. 
CHAPTER 5 UNIVERSITY OF OSLO MARIA DIKOVA 
63 
 
Kadet newspaper in Vladikavkaz turned out. They got a punch in the mouth and were told to shut up. 
Stalin [...] definitely protects his own scoundrels.
244
 
In terms of Riutin‟s criticism of Kirov, the Russian historian Yefimov, who presented Kirov 
as one of the most loyal supporters of Stalin, use Riutin‟s platform as an argument that Kirov 
was perceived as Stalin‟s close associate, even by Stalin‟s oppositionists.245 The Riutin affair 
and Kirov‟s role in it provides scholars who suggest Stalin‟s direct involvement in the murder 
of Kirov, with a motive for Stalin to eliminate Kirov as a political alternative: „Kirov‟s faith 
was decided already in 1932 due to his opposition of Riutin‟s assassination.‟246 Therefore, one 
may see that these scholars who have suggested Stalin‟s involvement in the murder of Kirov 
also generally claim that Kirov opposed Stalin in the Riutin case. However, those who refute 
Stalin‟s active role in the assassination of Kirov, tend to conclude that there is no 
documentation of a conflict between Kirov and Stalin over Riutin.  
STALIN AND OTHER CASES OF OPPOSITION 
The Riutin affair was not the only case of opposition to the Stalinist regime in the early 1930s. 
The Syrtsov-Lominadze bloc in 1930 and the Eismont-Smirnov-Tolmachev group in 1932 are 
other examples of oppositional cases to Stalin‟s regime. Analysis of Stalin‟s and Kirov‟s 
positions towards other oppositionist groupings may provide answers to such questions as 
whether Stalin could have initiated Riutin‟s execution in 1932 and whether Kirov was more 
“moderate” than other Stalinists in treating oppositionists. Similar to the case of the Riutin 
affair, there are certain challenges in studying circumstances around those oppositional cases, 
but to a lesser degree. Analysis of Stalin‟s and Kirov‟s role may, therefore, shed some light 
upon their respective roles when dealing with opposition. 
On the surface it could seem that Stalin reached unconditional authority within the Soviet 
Communist Party in 1930. He had managed to launch his policies from above in full. At the 
Sixteenth Party Congress held in 1930, there was no open opposition to the regime, and Stalin 
had created a network of loyal associates and outmanoeuvred his Left and Right opponents. 
On the other hand, I would claim that despite the establishment of Stalin‟s cult, his position 
was not yet entirely secured at that time. Graeme Gill also noted, “although throughout the 
period [1930 to 34] he [Stalin] was clearly the leading figure, his word was not law and he 
could not take the rest of the leadership for granted, the symbolism of collectivism still 
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retained some force.”247 As it had appeared by the autumn of 1930, Stalin‟s policy of forced 
collectivisation and destruction of the kulaks as a class plunged the entire country into chaos. 
As a result of Stalinist policies, there was a drastic drop in living standards, a decline in 
labour productivity and the collapse of the banking system.
248
 However, although Stalin had 
strengthened his position within the Party by succeeding in having outmanoeuvred two of the 
Right leaders, Bukharin and Tomsky, another one of the Right leaders, Rykov, was still 
present in the Politburo. As noted by Khlevniuk, due to the crisis of policies in the early 
1930s, the popularity of the Rightists rose, therefore weakening Stalin‟s authority.249 J. Arch 
Getty concluded that, “although the Party publicly celebrated the victory of their new policies, 
in their inner councils the Stalinist leaders felt more anxiety than confidence, and they 
perceived that their position was more fragile than secure”.250 Therefore, Stalin‟s personal 
power in 1930 was not as strong as it might be claimed to be. Stalin‟s insecure position in the 
party may explain his rather cautious utterances.  
Stalin‟s cautious position is evident particularly in his official treatment of his earlier 
supporters S.I. Syrtsov and V.V. Lominadze. On 2 December 1930, S.I. Syrtsov, the head of 
the government of the Russian Federation, and V.V. Lominadze, the first secretary of the 
Transcaucasian Party Committee, were accused of organising a leftist right-wing bloc. At the 
Politburo meeting on 4 November 1930, Stalin‟s associates demanded expulsion of both 
Syrtsov and Lominadze from the party, whereas, Stalin not only opposed their expulsion, but 
even proposed to keep them in the CC, where they would be demoted to candidate 
members.
251
 In that way Stalin‟s supporters held a more aggressive stance towards the 
Syrtsov-Lominadze group demanding their expulsion from the CC. Eventually, Smirnov and 
Lominadze were expelled from the CC, but not from the party. In the context of Stalin‟s 
moderate position in the Syrtsov-Lominadze case, it was unlikely that he could have initiated 
the proposition to execute Riutin. Kirov‟s position towards the Syrtsov-Lominadze group will 
be analysed later in this chapter.  
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On the other hand, it should be noted that the regime was not following any single consistent 
policy in treating the oppositionists. 
252
 It could be claimed that by the time of the appearance 
of Riutin‟s opposition in 1932, Stalin enjoyed full confidence within the Politburo. In order to 
terminate any attempts of opposition once and for all he could have indeed proposed the death 
penalty for Riutin. Since the Riutin platform also concerned many of Stalin‟s closest 
associates, he could have counted on their support for the death penalty proposal. 
Additionally, Stalin could have been annoyed by Riutin‟s earlier anti-party activities. In the 
autumn of 1930 Stalin wrote to Molotov regarding Riutin‟s activities: 
With regard to Riutin, it seems to me that it‟s impossible to limit ourselves to expelling him from 
the party. When some time has passed after his expulsion, he will have to be exiled somewhere as 
far as possible from Moscow. This counter-revolutionary scum should be completely disarmed.
253
 
Therefore, the Riutin platform in addition to the Syrtsov-Lominadze criticism exacerbated 
Stalin‟s patience. The execution of an oppositionist would threaten other oppositional 
groupings. However, I would claim that Riutin‟s accusations against Stalin in the Riutin 
platform could be used as evidence that Stalin‟s position was still relatively unstable in 1932. 
Although he had managed to expel the opposition within the leadership, there was certain 
discontent within the lower levels of the party. The year of 1932 was a particularly difficult 
one for the country. There was famine all around the Soviet Union and as a result there was a 
decrease in the labour productivity since the workers could not work effectively.
254
 Criticism 
of Stalin personally was at a high point in 1932. The political police had been discovering 
Riutin-like groups in various industrial cities – even though few could have had the 
opportunity to read the actual Riutin Platform.
255
 Stalin‟s vulnerability may be further 
substantiated by the Smirnov-Eismont-Tolmachev affair which took place in November 1932, 
just a month after the Riutin‟s trial.  
The Anti-party Counter-revolutionary Group of Smirnov, Eismont, Tolmachev and others was 
interpreted by Stalin and the party leadership as a rebirth of the Right deviation of the late 
1920s. All the Stalinist leaders, aware of how fragile their power still was, viewed party 
factionalism as the ultimate danger.
256
 In addition to the accusations of leading factional 
activities, Smirnov, Eismont, Tolmachev and others were accused of an attempt to replace the 
leadership, in particularly Stalin. An analysis of Stalin‟s speeches at the 27 November 
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Politburo meeting show that Stalin perceived the Smirnov-Eismont-Tolmachev case as an 
opposition to the general line rather than hostility towards him personally. He exclaimed, “It 
is evident that Smirnov and the rest paid special attention to Stalin in their testimony, they 
suggested that Stalin should be blamed and not the general line of the Party. […] In reality 
they fight not Stalin, but the Party, the general line which they consider disastrous.”257 
Similarly Stalin toned down the criticism coming from Lominadze and Syrtsov. At the 
November 1930 Politburo meeting Stalin exclaimed, “I will not discuss what was said about 
me personally. From the documents it is evident that Lominadze and Syrtsov found it 
necessary to curse and scold me. It is their business, let them curse.”258 Direct reference to 
Stalin‟s role in the current policies and opposition of his previous allies could weaken his 
position. As a result, Stalin urge to tone down the significance of the oppositional grouping of 
Syrtsov-Lominadze and the Eismont group demonstrates his awareness of his insecure 
position. 
Stalin seemed to be aware of increasing criticism towards him in the lower levels of the 
Communist Party. It is for this reason that he generally did not present himself as an initiator 
of radical proposals in order not to undermine his position even further. As a result of a 
resolution of the CC in January 1933, Eismont and Tolmachev were expelled from the party 
and condemned with three years of imprisonment, whereas Smirnov was merely expelled 
from the CC.
259
  
Relatively mild punishment of the oppositionists in the 1930s may demonstrate the fact that 
Stalin was careful with using repression to his associates. A similar view has been suggested 
by Graeme Gill, where he claims that the limits to Stalin‟s power and authority could be 
reflected in the treatment of opposition in the early 1930s.
260
 In the context of relatively mild 
treatment of other anti-party groupings, it was unlikely that Stalin could have demanded 
Riutin‟s assassination. Treatment of the oppositional groupings in the early 1930s suggest that 
Stalin preferred to use other methods to dealing with oppositionists, such as expulsion from 
the Party, dismissal from posts, exile and moral humiliation.
261
 Harsh repression methods 
against possible oppositionists were used in the late 1930s. In the early 1930s, Stalin officially 
presented himself as a moderate leader as far as dealing with the opposition was concerned.  
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KIROV ON OPPOSITIONISTS 
In order to understand whether Kirov could oppose Stalin in the Riutin affair (if there was 
one), it is necessary to establish Kirov‟s position in other intra-party conflicts in the early 
1930s. There is little known about Kirov‟s personal attitude towards oppositionists due to a 
generally limited amount of documents regarding anti-party cases of the 1930s. It is for this 
reason stenographic reports from the Politburo meetings represent a central source in the 
discussion of Kirov‟s role in the anti-party cases of the early 1930s.  
However, one of the main challenges in understanding Kirov‟s actual position lies within the 
fact that he was seldom present at Politburo meetings in Moscow. Out of thirty-seven 
Politburo meetings held in 1932, Kirov was present only at nine of them.
262
 For instance, he 
did not participate at the Politburo meeting regarding the question of Syrtsov and Lominadze 
in November 1930 when Stalin opposed Lominadze‟s and Syrtsov‟s expulsion from the party. 
Lominadze was a close acquaintance of both Kirov and Ordzhonikidze from their work in the 
Caucasus before 1926. Kirov‟s absence from the Politburo meetings may be interpreted in 
two ways. Close association with the oppositionist Lominadze and the possible knowledge of 
the existence of the anti-party group could have undermined Kirov‟s position in the party and 
questioned his loyalty. Therefore, one may consider Kirov‟s absence as an attempt to avoid 
questioning his role in the case. On the other hand, there could be other reasons for Kirov‟s 
absence from Moscow at that time. The Russian researcher Kirilina claimed that Kirov was 
away from Moscow in 1932 due to illness or holiday rather than his support of 
oppositionists.
263
  
There are minor inconsistencies with Kirilina‟s presentation of Kirov‟s involvement in the 
anti-party cases in the early 1930s. Referring to the opis 3 in the Politburo fond, 17, case 703 
in the RGASPI archive, Kirilina suggested that Kirov was neither present during the 
discussion of the joint Politburo nor the Central Control Committee on 27 November 1932, 
nor the Smirnov-Eismont-Tolmachev group.
264
 However, according to the opis 163 in the 
same Politburo fond 17, case 1009, it is evident that Kirov was not only present, but also held 
a speech about the anti-party group of Smirnov.
265
 This gives reason as to why it is difficult to 
understand exactly which Politburo meeting Kirilina was referring in the claim that Kirov was 
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first on a vacation and then ill.
266
 Kirov‟s absence could also be interpreted as an illustration 
that his priorities lay in the administration of the Leningrad region rather than central party 
politics.  
Although Kirov was not present at the Syrtsov-Lominadze Politburo meeting, he was chosen 
to deliver reports about intra-party affairs in Transcaucasia where Lominadze was a local 
Party secretary. This fact may demonstrate that Kirov was considered by the Party as a loyal 
follower of the resolutions of the Party despite his friendship with the charged Lominadze. 
Kirov himself noted in a speech to the Transcaucasian committee, delivered on 18 November 
1930 that, „Friendship remains friendship, it is a good thing, acquaintance remains 
acquaintance, however politics comes first, our Bolshevik politics.‟267  His official speech 
implies his disappointment and dissatisfaction with Lominadze‟s possible opposition to the 
general line: “Lominadze was our fellow, one hundred percent Caucasian, we knew him from 
the time he began to climb the political ladder...such a good fellow... and we see how it turned 
out.”268 Kirov also referred to his personal conversations with Lominadze, where he seemed 
in some way to excuse him, saying, „Lominadze got hopelessly sick, he imagined that we [the 
Party] have entered the period of such a crisis, from which there is no way out.‟269  Due to the 
choice of words, like “sick” and “imagine”, it may appear that it was not Lominadze‟s 
personal fault, but rather bad influence. As also noted by Amy Knight, however, Kirov‟s 
speech seemed to be apologetic in some way: he generally condemned their oppositional 
positions in that speech and the speech delivered in Baku some days later.  
Due to his cautious statements concerning Lominadze and an attempt to excuse his position, 
Kirov may seem to be moderate in dealing with oppositionists. Nevertheless, as it has been 
noted earlier, Stalin presented himself as a moderate in that case by opposing the expulsion of 
Lominadze and Syrtsov from the party. Kirov‟s cautious position in treating Lominadze 
seemed to be dictated by his personal acquaintance rather than political sympathies. 
Moreover, Kirov was rather aggressive in his speech about the Smirnov-Eismont-Tolmachev 
group, delivered in November 1932. Regarding the Rightist leaders, Tomsky in particular, 
Kirov exclaimed, “Your position is completely unique in this regard. If every party member 
should now punch an oppositionist in the snout, then you should be punching twice as hard 
and twice as strongly, assuming that you have really broken with your past.”270 Noted by 
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Khlevniuk when editing the stenographic record, Kirov softened his wording by replacing 
“punch in the snout” with “punch politically.”271 An analysis of the Politburo stenographic 
reports suggests that Kirov seemed to occupy only a secondary role in the anti-party cases of 
the early 1930s. His position towards oppositionists did not differentiate from the rest of the 
members of the Stalinist elite who, like Stalin, condemned factional positions. In that respect, 
it is questionable whether Kirov could be an initiator of „reconciliation with former 
oppositionists‟, or, in the words of Stephen Cohen, a „protector of various prominent 
Bolsheviks from Stalin‟s wrath.‟272 
It was suggested by Medvedev that Zinoviev and Kamenev were restored in the party in 1933 
due to Kirov‟s personal influence.273 Zinoviev and Kamenev, leaders of the Left Opposition 
in 1926, were in fact admitted back into the party on the decision of the Politburo on 12 
December 1933. Accessible documentation does not suggest that Kirov occupied any special 
role in the re-admission of the former oppositionists to the Party. Re-admission of the former 
oppositionists and their presence at the Seventeenth Party Congress was favourable for Stalin 
himself. At the Seventeenth Party Congress, former oppositionists officially accepted Stalin‟s 
line as the only “correct” policy. Their presence at the Congress symbolised consolidation of 
Stalin‟s personal power.274 In contrast, at the Seventeenth Party Congress, Kirov mocked 
members of the opposition and questioned their sincerity: “What is left to do for those who 
were brought up the rear? They, comrades, are trying to wedge themselves in our triumph; 
they are trying to remain abreast, to keep up with music, to support our growth. No matter 
how hard they try, they cannot manage.”275  For example, he commented on Bukharin‟s 
speech at the Congress, saying figuratively, “Bukharin, for example, seems to be singing the 
notes, but his voice is false. I won‟t say anything about Comrade Rykov or Tomsky.”276 It 
may be considered, however, that Kirov‟s hostility towards oppositionists was only public. 
Nonetheless, there is no other evidence of his soft treatment of oppositionists otherwise.  
KIROV’S POLITICAL OUTLOOK IN THE EARLY 1930S 
Medvedev also claimed that during 1933 Kirov spoke in the Politburo several times in favour 
of more flexible policies and certain “liberalisation”.277 It is unfortunate that Medvedev did 
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not refer to any specific speeches of Kirov. Overall analysis of Kirov‟s speeches in the first 
years of the 1930s has not suggested any trace of opposition to Stalin‟s regime. After the 
Sixteenth Party Congress held between 26 June and 13 July 1930 Kirov continued to advocate 
the Congress‟s resolutions, such as the completion of the Five Year Plan in four years, and 
further establishment of socialism in the countryside and the cities. In his speeches Kirov did 
not go beyond ideas presented by Stalin at that time. On the basis of the archival 
documentation, it seems that Kirov simply supported general changes towards moderation in 
the Soviet policies in 1933, rather than being a leader of the liberal course. 
As mentioned earlier, as a result of Stalin‟s policies of accelerated industrialisation and forced 
collectivisation, the Soviet Union plunged into a profound economic and social crisis in the 
early 1930s. In addition to extensive hunger caused by the poor harvest of 1931 and pressure 
for grain from the state there was general stagnation in the labour productivity, increased 
inflation and a disrupted financial system.
278
 There were food riots and social discontent all 
over the Soviet Union. The crisis reached its peak in the winter of 1932 when the famine was 
at its worst. There was a possibility of an imminent collapse of agriculture as well as 
industrialisation. According to Nicolaevsky, Kirov‟s line and tactics distinct from Stalin 
began to take shape around that time, „Kirov‟s distinct position from Stalin was especially 
clear at the CC January plenum of 1933.‟279 However, analysis of Kirov‟s statements around 
the January plenum does not sustain theories of Kirov‟s reformist position. 
First and foremost, examination of the archival documentation preserved in the RGASPI does 
not suggest Kirov‟s oppositional role at the plenum. Kirov was not among the central speakers 
at the January Plenum.  Delegates of the plenum primarily discussed the results of the first 
Five Year Plan and further industrialisation plan. Kirov‟s speech about the results of the 
January plenum on 17 January 1933, delivered in Leningrad, was a reflection of Stalin‟s 
statements about the results of the first Five Year plan. In his speech Kirov declared Stalin‟s 
speech as the most important „programme document‟.280 Consequently in the early 1930s, 
Kirov not only supported Stalin, but also had contributed to the formation of Stalin‟s cult of 
personality. It may be seen in Kirov‟s speeches that reference to Stalin‟s utterances became 
more frequent. He glorified Stalin personally, as well as his ideas, and proclaimed Stalin‟s 
statements as the exemplary for the rest of the Communists.    
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The first signs of the relaxation policies in agriculture were already present as early as May 
1932, when the Soviet government reduced targets for grain procurement plan in 1932 and 
1933. In the Politburo archive, there are several protocols of the Politburo meetings in 1932 
and 1933 where the Leningrad delegation required more supplies from Moscow and 
demanded reductions in procurement plans.
281
 However, there were similar appeals from 
other Politburo members, such as Yan Rudzutak, a Politburo member, in January 1932 and 
Stanislav Kosior, regional secretary of the Ukraine, in March 1932.
282
 Consequently, Kirov 
was not the only speaker of the moderate corrections in the agricultural policies. It may be 
assumed that regional leaders acted in unity against the existing central policies. However, it 
seems that they did not act as a united oppositional grouping, but rather as individual leaders 
who were standing up for the interests of their own domains.
283
 The reduction was caused by 
a generally difficult situation in the countryside, rather than thought-through actions from 
Kirov. Like other regional secretaries, Kirov also seemed to act on the basis of the interests of 
his region.  
To a certain extent, the intensifying crisis forced the Soviet leadership to recognise the 
destructive results of Stalin‟s policies and adopt new reforms aimed at relaxation.284 Besides 
the domestic crisis, new foreign policy factors, such as the threat from Fascist Germany and 
the Soviet Union‟s desire to conclude an anti-Fascist pact with France in 1933 also required 
the softening of the domestic order in the Soviet Union.
285
 R.W. Davies noted that in the 
course of 1931 to 1933 there was no prolonged period of liberalisation as such, but rather 
periods of greater repression alternated with periods of greater relaxation.
286
 Vacillation of the 
general line at this time may demonstrate that policies in the 1930s were formed in terms of 
“crisis pragmatism”. The Soviet administration did not seem to have an organised and 
moderate set of reforms, but it seemed rather to initiate policies under pressure from 
prevailing circumstances.  
It seems that Stalin himself played a significant role in the formulation of the relaxation 
policies in the early 1930s. As it has been demonstrated earlier in this chapter, Stalin‟s 
position in part depended on the success of his policies from above. However, as a result of 
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his policies there was a deep crisis and discontent in the masses. Stalin participated in most of 
the specific proposals and in the ideological and propagandistic bases for changes to the 
general line.
287
 For instance, together with Molotov Stalin was responsible for the reduction 
of repression in the countryside. In May 1933, Stalin and Molotov ordered the release of half 
of all camp inmates whose infractions were connected with collectivisation.
288
 Therefore, it 
may be concluded that even if Kirov was an adherent of liberalisation of the 1930s, he simply 
supported Stalin and the relaxation that was already underway. Similar conclusions were 
reached by Khlevniuk, who also claimed that the only moderate course Kirov was in favour of 
was the one already evident.
289
 As a result, Kirov‟s support of the relaxation policies in the 
1930s only proves the point that he was a loyal supporter of the general line rather than 
representing an opposition. The question remains as to what other factors have contributed to 
the theory about Kirov‟s “moderate” leadership in the Party.  
First and foremost, the archival materials reveal frequent conflicts between the Moscow and 
the Leningrad administration. Traditionally historians tended to interpret conflicts between 
these two administrations in terms of Kirov‟s independent position within the Soviet Party 
and his wish for a new liberal course. However, from the analysis of the documents it seems 
that conflicts between Leningrad and Moscow have been, at times, exaggerated. In those 
conflicts, Kirov seemed to act as a leader of an important administrative centre and his 
requests to Moscow primarily concerned such issues as distribution of resources and budget 
demands. Such demands were rather typical not only for the Leningrad administration, but 
also for other regions in the Soviet Union. It appears that local governments were constantly 
demanding that the centre give them new capital to invest and additional food and industrial 
quota.
290
  Frictions between Leningrad and Moscow may be interpreted in terms of typical 
conflicts between the centre and periphery rather than personal disagreements between Kirov 
and the central administration.  
Kirov‟s speeches delivered in the 1930s portray Kirov as a responsible leader of Leningrad, 
rather than a contender for leadership of the Communist Party. Kirov seemed to be 
preoccupied with the internal situation within the Leningrad region. As a result of increasing 
population, the Leningrad administration faced problems with the distribution of fuel, the 
water supply and the sewerage system. By 1934, the population of Leningrad increased to 
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three million people, whereas in 1926 the population was 1.1 million people.
291
 Although in 
his speeches Kirov mentioned general policies of the party, he generally focused more on the 
local developments in Leningrad. In several speeches he promoted a better life for the 
Leningrad workers and their families, focused on the importance of schooling specialists and 
the improvement of the general level of literacy among the population.  
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier in this chapter Kirov was quite seldom at the Politburo 
meetings in Moscow. If Kirov had ambitions to change the course of policy he should have 
attended the Politburo meetings which were in the centre of the formulation of policies. It 
may be presumed that Kirov did not participate in the Politburo meetings in order not to 
attract attention to his alternative position. However, by not attending the Politburo meetings 
he attracted even more attention. Stalin thoroughly watched the attendance of the Politburo 
meetings.
292
 There is also a theory that Stalin personally tried to prevent Kirov from attending 
Moscow in 1934: “The story is told that Stalin had prevented Kirov from attending the 
meetings of the Politburo in Moscow for several months under the pretext that his presence in 
Leningrad was indispensable”.293 However, archival materials revealed that Kirov was very 
busy with administration of his region and did not wish to leave his Leningrad affairs, which 
required his presence. Moreover, whenever present at the Politburo meetings Kirov did not 
seem to actively participate in the deliberations. Khrushchev recollected that Mikoyan told 
him that, „He [Kirov] did not make statements on any issues. He kept silence. I don‟t know 
what it meant.‟294 Politburo documents also reveal that Kirov did not play any distinguished 
role in the deliberations. Therefore, Kirov did not seem to have ambitions to change the 
central policies. A similar conclusion was reached by Khlevniuk when noting that, „Kirov 
conducted himself less like a full member of the Politburo and more like an influential 
administrator of one of the country‟s major party organisations.‟295  
There is, however, the theory that Kirov played a decisive role in the elimination of ration 
cards for bread, which was adopted during the November plenum of the CC in 1934. Kirov‟s 
alleged role in the elimination of ration cards has been considered as one of the most 
important signs of Kirov‟s liberalisation. The abolishment of the ration system signified the 
reorientation of the economic policy from being primarily based on repressive administrative 
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measures to being more open.
296
 The suppositions that Kirov initiated the abolishment of the 
ration cards originated from an account of Aleksandr Orlov, an earlier NKVD officer. Orlov‟s 
assumptions were based on a conflict between Leningrad and Moscow in 1934. Kirov used 
reserved supplies from the Leningrad Military District without permission from Moscow. 
When Kirov was criticised for his actions by the central leadership, he explained that workers 
had to be fed. Allegedly, Stalin asked why Leningrad workers should eat better than all the 
others. Kirov exclaimed in response that it was the time to abolish the ration system and start 
feeding workers as they should be fed.
297
 However, there is no document in the archival 
documentation to support Orlov‟s theory. The rationing system was originally proclaimed as a 
temporary measure in the early 1930s caused by the poor harvests, procurement crisis and the 
lack of grain. However, the situation improved already by the beginning of 1934, due to a 
successful harvest of 1933. In one of his letters to Kaganovich on 22 October 1934, Stalin 
considered the elimination of the ration system as an important reform and he asserted to 
implement it in full in January 1935: 
We must have in the state‟s hands 1.4 billion to 1.5 billion poods of grain in order to get rid of the 
rationing system for bread at the end of this year, a system that until recently was necessary and useful 
but has now shackled the national economy. We must get rid of the rationing system for bread [...]. 
This reform, which I consider an extremely serious reform, should be prepared right away, so that it 
can begin to be implemented in full in January 1935. But in order to carry out this reform, we must 
have a sufficient reserve of grain.
298
  
Stalin‟s letter to Kaganovich demonstrates that Stalin personally was aware of the need for 
elimination of the ration cards for bread and he favoured the reform eventually. The 
elimination of the ration system was implemented under the leadership of Stalin himself. At 
the November plenum in 1934, Kirov‟s ideas did not seem to go beyond ideas of other 
members of Stalin‟s circle. In the RGASPI, there is a sketch of Kirov‟s speech about the 
results of the November plenum, which he was supposed to deliver the day he was murdered. 
In his personal notes prepared for the speech Kirov wrote about the significance of the 
elimination of the ration system and its positive implications.
299
 Other than general 
evaluations of the reform, there is no inclination towards any different view from the rest of 
the Stalinists. Kirov‟s notes basically reflected the main points delivered in Stalin‟s speech at 
the plenum. Stalin emphasised the importance of understanding the need for the elimination of 
the ration system and its implications.
300
 Consequently, Stalin‟s position in favour of the 
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reform does not suggest any conflict between Kirov and Stalin over the elimination of the 
ration system. The Politburo‟s special folders implicate that there was no possible division 
between soft- and hard-liners. Earlier classified files from the Politburo archive indicate a 
general consensus in the Politburo in 1934.   
THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 
According to Nicolaevsky‟s account, „Kirov unfolded the basic features of his master plan at 
the Seventeenth Party Congress.‟301 As a result, the events during the Seventeenth Party 
Congress have been central in the discussion of Kirov‟s possible opposition to Stalin and his 
alternative position within the Party. On the surface it could seem that the Seventeenth Party 
Congress in some way represented a beginning of a new phase in the history of the 
Communist Party. For the first time, there was no official opposition to the established 
policies. The Party leadership was unanimous in the correctness of the economic model. The 
economic crisis that the Party faced earlier in industry and agriculture was practically over. 
The successful harvest of 1933 was perceived as the first proof of correctness of the General 
Line of the party.
302
 Participants of the Congress enthusiastically praised Stalin as their vozhd, 
or the leader, and seemed to believe that the worst of their worries were behind them.
303
 At 
the Seventeenth Congress, or otherwise also known as the „Congress of Victors‟, the Soviet 
party gave an impression of a monolithic, harmonious and united group.  
However, the analysis of the stenographic reports taken during the Seventeenth Party 
Congress revealed some disagreements within the nucleus of the Party. Reports taken during 
the Seventeenth Congress do not suggest conflicts between Kirov and Stalin, but they reveal a 
disagreement between Ordzhonikidze and Molotov over the rate of further economic 
planning.
304
 The question is whether the conflict between Ordzhonikidze and Molotov can be 
explained in terms of the disagreements between the “moderates” and the “radicals”, or 
whether it was a personal conflict between the two.  
Ordzhonikidze, a commissar for heavy industry, advocated a slower tempos for the Second 
Five Year Plan whereas Molotov inclined to proceed with a tempos as high as during the First 
Five Year Plan throughout the early 1930s. Disagreements about the rate of the Second Five 
Year Plan were already evident in 1931, when the Gosplan, with Kuibyshev at its head, began 
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drafting the plan. The first version caused so many arguments that it was closed from all 
public discussion of the Plan and was even suspended from publication.
305
 Perhaps that is 
why there is little reference to the Second Year Plan in Kirov‟s speeches around that time. 
The second version with reduced targets was introduced in February 1932. In January 1932, at 
one of the Leningrad conferences, Kirov stated: 
Do we set too high targets for ourselves [for the second Five Year Plan]? The first Five Year Plan 
should be the bail and examination for us here. We have accomplished it successfully in 1932. ...The 
programme for the Second Five Year Plan does not differ from the first one in a way that there is 
nothing extraordinary, nothing impossible for the Bolsheviks there. This plan, this programme, in 
Stalin‟s words – it is our preparedness for struggle, our self-control and our desire for victory. 306   
It is seen that in his speech Kirov supported high tempos for the second Five Year plan. 
Finally, a third version of the Plan was introduced at the CC plenum in January 1933. The 
third version contained the lowest targets and its approach was approved by Stalin.
307
 In his 
speech about the results of the CC plenum, Kirov stated that Stalin‟s speech set the main 
targets‟ further development. 308  In his speech, Kirov showed full loyalty to the adopted 
resolutions. He stated that it was necessary to fulfil the designated targets. Kirov said, “The 
plan is an order. It means don‟t argue, just fulfil.”309  From Kirov‟s speeches it does not seem 
like he had any distinguished position regarding the tempos for the second Five Year plan 
throughout the 1930s. Ordzhonikidze seemed to play a more central role in regards to the 
planning of the second Five Year plan than Kirov. For instance, at the Seventeenth Party 
Congress, Ordzhonikidze proposed even lower annual targets than was planned. 
The Second Five Year Plan was ought to be approved at the Congress and it was for this 
reason that it was on the top of agenda then. As noted by Getty discussions and debates on the 
speeches at party congresses had become routine by 1934. Due to this it was seen „unusual 
and even scandalous that Ordzhonikidze openly challenged figures presented in Molotov‟s 
speech as being inconsistent.‟ 310  Ordzhonikidze‟s opposition suggested a depth of 
disagreement over the tempos. The matter was ought to be settled by the commission in a 
closed session, which decided to accept Ordzhonikidze‟s proposal of reduction of Molotov‟s 
figures. Finally, Stalin sided with the “moderates” regarding the second Five Year Plan. 
Therefore Kirov and Stalin could not be antagonists since Stalin himself supported moderate 
rates for further economic development. Since Stalin sided with Ordzhonikidze on the tempos 
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of the second Five Year plan there is no reason to believe that Ordzhonikidze wished for 
Stalin‟s replacement since he got his way even with Stalin. From the archival documents, 
Ordzhonikidze clearly appears as a more “moderate” candidature than Kirov. After a thorough 
analysis of the documentation, Khlevniuk arrived at the conclusion that the lowering of the 
pace should be considered in terms of continuation of the struggle between different branches 
of government over ratios between production and capital investment.
311
 In the disagreement 
over the ratio for the second Five Year plan, Ordzhonikidze was acting as a commissar of the 
heavy industry, rather than as a representative of a “moderate” grouping or out of personal 
rivalry with Molotov. 
With regards to Kirov at the Seventeenth Congress, Cohen noted that, „the “moderates” under 
the leadership of Kirov, unlike Stalin, spoke with an unmistakably conciliatory spirit.‟312 
According to Nicolaevsky‟s account, “Kirov called upon all Party members for the closest 
unity, based on the voluntary subordination of the minority to the majority, since only with 
such unity could the Party exercise hegemony in the country.” 313  However, analysis of 
Kirov‟s speech does not provide a similar view. Kirov conveyed himself as an enthusiastic 
Stalinist in his speech at the Congress. There is no trace of opposition or moderation in his 
delivered speech. He spoke generally about the developments in the Leningrad region, about 
upcoming possible challenges and their solutions. Moreover, in frequent references to the 
correctness of Stalin‟s programme, Kirov openly demonstrated his support to Stalin 
personally. In some way Kirov‟s speech could even be characterised as fawning on Stalin.314 
Therefore, like the rest of the members of Stalin‟s clique, Kirov provided for the development 
of Stalin‟s cult of personality. Like the rest of the delegates Kirov honoured Stalin and praised 
him as the „best a helmsman of our Socialist building‟ and „the great strategist‟. All of the 
delegates praised Stalin in their speeches.
315
 However, it is interesting that Kirov was the one 
to propose to „accept Stalin‟s report in full, as party law‟ without usual preparation of a 
resolution on Stalin‟s report.316 Kirov‟s proposition in some way brought a cult of Stalin to a 
different level. Therefore, his speech distinguished itself due to his especial praise of Stalin 
rather opposition to him. It may be assumed that those expressions of praise were only formal 
celebration of Stalin. Presumably, Kirov tried to conceal his opposition to Stalin behind the 
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elevated words. However, there is no document or speech that can either prove or contradict 
that view.  
In the stenographic report from the Congress, it is clear that Kirov‟s speech was energetically 
welcomed by the delegates. His speech caused a „prolonged storm of standing applause‟.317 
Scholars have compared such a reception to that of Stalin‟s, concluding that such an 
extraordinarily enthusiastic reception was second or even equal to Stalin‟s.318 Perhaps that is 
why Stalin decided to abstain from a final address to the Congress which was his typical 
finale. Historians interpret in a way that Kirov stole the show by elevating Stalin 
unprecedented heights.
319
 It seems that the significance of the prolonged applause to Kirov 
was exaggerated throughout time. The reaction of the audience could be explained by the fact 
that Kirov was a skilful orator and his speech was energetic and appealing. Moreover, from 
the comments during Kirov‟s speech, it is evident that the audience applauded when Kirov 
mentioned the greatness of Stalin. For instance, there was no standing ovation when Kirov 
was speaking about success in Leningrad. Therefore it may be considered that the ovation was 
not personally to Kirov, but rather to Stalin. Furthermore, the ovation for Molotov and 
Kaganovich, unconditional hard-line Stalinists, were stronger.
320
 Nevertheless, a prolonged 
ovation to Kirov was interpreted as a sign of broad support to Kirov from the Congress. 
Apparently, on the eve of the Seventeenth Congress, Kirov was asked by his fellow comrades 
to replace Stalin as a General Secretary.  
 THE QUESTION OF STALIN’S REPLACEMENT 
The view that Kirov was offered to replace Stalin as the General Secretary originated from the 
presentations given by Roy Medvedev in the late 1980s. Medvedev concluded that during the 
Seventeenth Party Congress the group of the secretaries of regional Party committees and 
secretaries of the non-Russian central committees personally asked Kirov to replace Stalin in 
the post of the General Secretary.
321
 Apparently regional leaders felt the results of Stalin‟s 
policy errors more than anyone else and it is due to this that they united to replace Stalin. 
Medvedev‟s story has been used by historians as one of the arguments to prove that Kirov 
represented an alternative to Stalin. Although appealing, Medvedev‟s theory suffers some 
factual inconsistencies.  
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First and foremost, it is noteworthy that the General Secretary was usually elected during the 
CC plenum and not during congresses.
322
 Moreover, as rightfully noted by Egge, Medvedev 
did not specify any sources besides „the scanty reports from Old Bolsheviks‟ regarding the 
story of the possible replacement of Stalin.
323
 Medvedev‟s story presumably stemmed from 
various recollections of the Seventeenth Congress delegates published in the 1960s. Some of 
them inclined there was a private meeting to replace Stalin with Kirov, while others denied 
that as rumours.
324
 Generally, none of those delegates was a witness or a participant of the 
conversation about Stalin‟s replacement by Kirov. Kirilina also noted that it was suspicious 
that all of the recollections appeared almost simultaneously in 1960 and not after the 
Twentieth Party Congress when people returned from camps and prisons. Such recollections 
did not either appear in 1957 when the first investigation commission was set up.
325
 As a 
result, it is still uncertain whether there was a private meeting during the Seventeenth Party 
Congress where Kirov was proposed to replace Stalin. Kirilina concluded that the theory 
about conversations was a mystification. She noted that such a conversation could not occur 
at Ordzhonikidze‟s flat: Ordzhonikidze was loyal to Stalin around that time.326  
In his conversations with Chuev Molotov remembered that a group of around ten members 
proposed that Kirov replace Stalin in the post of the General Secretary, but Kirov refused.
327
 
Molotov also denied that Kirov personally had aspirations to replace Stalin: “although Kirov 
was a capable regional leader and could work masses well, he was unsuitable as a leader of 
the highest rank”.328  It is necessary to remember that Molotov was a very close associate with 
Stalin and remained as such until the end. Therefore, he was aware of many of the matters 
important to Stalin. As noted by Egge, there is no reason to believe that Molotov needed to 
contrive the story. On the contrary, as a loyal follower of Stalin he would rather conceal the 
facts of the story that a leading nucleus of the Party wanted to replace Stalin.
329
 However, in 
his conversations Molotov did not tell the source of his suppositions either. It may be 
considered that, like Medvedev, he was also influenced by the reports of the delegates in the 
1960s. However, it should be noted that Molotov was devoted to Stalin until the end. 
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Therefore, his story might be subjective. He praised and honoured Stalin and it is 
understandable that Kirov could not be compared with Stalin‟s “greatness”.   
Several historians, such as Kirilina, Khlevniuk and Getty, concluded that Kirov could not be 
an alternative to Stalin. In my opinion, Kirov personally did not have the aspirations to 
replace Stalin as the leader of the party and he did not have a distinguished position from 
Stalin. However, that does not mean to say that he could not be considered as an alternative to 
Stalin by other members of the Party, or, for that matter, that Stalin did not perceive Kirov to 
be a political threat. 
It seems that Kirov could be in fact be considered as a suitable alternative to Stalin in the 
middle of the 1930s by his fellow Communists due to his modest, but loyal, position within 
the party. Stalin‟s authority within the Party was more or less unquestionable by 1934. Some 
of the Old Bolsheviks may have been annoyed by Stalin‟s power and wished for collective 
leadership that was present during Lenin. Kirov‟s candidature seemed to be the most 
appropriate. He was tolerant, loyally followed the Party throughout the period, had friendly 
relationships with the leading members of the Party and presented himself as a popular leader 
in general. To conclude, even if Kirov was considered to be a new leader, he was chosen as 
one not because of his distinguished position within the Party, but rather due to his 
unremarkable role. Conquest conveyed a similar view when he suggested that Kirov was ideal 
as a representative for a collective leadership with no claim to supremacy.
330
 On the other 
hand, it may be claimed that in the early 1930s Stalin was still quite collegial in his manner 
and this changed over time. Increasing alienation from the political elite was evident later in 
the Stalin‟s regime.331 Presumably, despite Stalin‟s attempt to present himself as an arbiter 
between different extremes, some of the Party members may have been displeased with his 
rising authority. The question of elections during the Seventeenth party congress can shed 
some light upon this issue. 
THE QUESTION OF THE CC ELECTIONS 
Dubious theories around the results of the elections of the new CC membership, held on 9 
February 1934 have acquired special significance in theories regarding a possible opposition 
to Stalin in this year. Official results of polling of the Seventeenth Party Congress delegates 
revealed that Kirov received four votes against his candidature and Stalin only three as 
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members of the CC. However, some time later an assumption appeared that suggested that the 
results of the elections were falsified by Stalin‟s associate Kaganovich, who led the counting 
committee, when he found out that Stalin had received fewer votes than any other 
candidate.
332
 Since there were more than one thousand participants in the elections, results of 
the elections revealed that the Soviet leadership was displeased with Stalin, whereas Kirov 
was unquestionably among the Party‟s favourites.  
It is unclear as to how many votes Stalin in fact received against his candidature at the 
election of the CC in 1934. The actual number of votes against Stalin‟s candidature in the CC 
has varied from 300 to 160 on different accounts. Roy Medvedev, for example, noted that as 
many as 270 delegates voted against Stalin.
333
 Medvedev‟s assumptions were based on an 
account of one of the surviving members of the counting committee V. M. Verkhovykh, who 
wrote in 1960: 
Being a delegate of the Seventeenth Congress..., I was elected to count the ballots. Altogether 
there were chosen sixty five or seventy five people, I do not remember exactly. I neither remember 
how many ballot boxes there were, either thirteen or fifteen... There were supposed to be 1225 or 
1227 members at the elections. 1222 voted. Stalin, Molotov and Kaganovich received the most 
votes “against”. Each of them received more than one hundred votes against, I do not remember 
exactly, but I believe Stalin obtained 125 or 123”.334 
It is evident that the author seemed to be unsure about the results and it should be taken into 
consideration that this was written more than thirty years after the actual elections. The theory 
about falsification of the results of the elections became appealing to the adherents of a theory 
that the Soviet Party was displeased with Stalin. However, there is no factual record in the 
existing documents that there were as many as 267 bulletins missing. On the basis of the 
investigation commission that was set up in 1957 to inspect Kirov‟s murder, it was concluded 
that there were 1227 delegates who had a voting authority at the elections, whereas 1059 
votes were submitted. It is evident that no more than 166 bulletins or votes were missing.
335
 
As a result, it may be assumed that Medvedev‟s account contained improbable results. If 
Stalin received more than three votes against his candidature it could not have exceeded more 
than 166 votes.  
In their recollections, three surviving delegates of the thirteen who counted the ballots agreed 
that there were some votes against Stalin, but they were not certain about the amount. Neither 
did they recollect Kaganovich‟s order to burn votes against Stalin or withdraw of any ballots. 
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Generally, most of them merely agreed that there were fewer ballots than the number of 
participating delegates in the Congress. It may be assumed that some of the delegates simply 
failed to vote. Elections were held on the last day of the Seventeenth Party Congress, in which 
case some of the delegates could have left the Congress earlier, or merely failed to participate 
in the elections.
336
 Scholars tend to imply that it was not unusual that some of the ballots were 
missing from the final count. There are some other examples of missing ballots after the 
opening of the urns in Soviet history. For example, at the Sixteenth Party Congress that was 
held in 1930 there were 1266 delegates with a voting authority. There were 1259 ballots, 
whereas only 1132 were eventually submitted.
337
 Therefore, it is questionable whether the 
ballots from the counting boxes at the Seventeenth Party Congress were withdrawn on 
Stalin‟s demand, or whether there is another explanation for their absence. The fact that Kirov 
received only some votes against may be explained by his modest position within the party, 
rather than his popularity.
 
 In the case of his oppositional position within the party, he could 
have acquired more votes against his candidature.
338
 Unanimous polling of Kirov was indirect 
proof of his support to Stalin and not his opposition to Stalin.  
TRANSFER TO MOSCOW 
At the same CC plenum where elections to the Politburo were held, Kirov was formally 
elected as one of four Central Committee secretaries on the proposal by Stalin. As a result of 
his new appointment, Kirov was to leave his position as the Leningrad party chief and move 
to Moscow. However, Kirov resisted leaving his position in Leningrad for a new one in 
Moscow. He himself explained his reluctance on the basis of an unfinished second Five Year 
Plan, his unpreparedness to move to Moscow and deteriorating health. Allegedly, Kirov‟s 
reasoning to stay in Leningrad was supported by Ordzhonikidze and Kuybyshev. As a result 
of Kirov‟s reaction and support of other Politburo members Stalin walked out from the 
meeting enraged.
339
 The affair ended in a compromise: Kirov would be elected as a Central 
Committee secretary, but could nevertheless keep his position as the Leningrad party leader 
for the two upcoming years.  
This account originated from memoirs of Mikhail Rosliakov, a close associate of Kirov in the 
1930s, who allegedly acquired the information from Kirov himself. For years Rosliakov‟s 
account was used as direct evidence of existing estrangement between Kirov and Stalin in the 
                                                     
336
 Alla Kirilina, Neizvestny Kirov, 2001, 320. 
337
 Matt Lenoe, “Did Stalin Kill Kirov and Does it Matter?”, in Journal of Modern History 74, June 2002, 374. 
338
 Yu.V. Yemelianov, Stalin na vershine vlasti, (Moscow, 2003), 74. 
339
 M. Rosliakov, “Kak eto bylo”, in Zvezda Nr. 7, 1989, 82. 
CHAPTER 5 UNIVERSITY OF OSLO MARIA DIKOVA 
83 
 
early 1930s. The conflict between Stalin and Kirov over Kirov‟s transfer to Moscow has been 
verified by the archival documentation.
340
 The question remains as to whether Kirov‟s refusal 
to Stalin was a sign of policy disagreement, as it may be assumed. 
Kirov‟s objections could be explained by his desire to proceed with his familiar work in 
Leningrad. As demonstrated earlier in this chapter, Kirov was fond of his work in Leningrad. 
Over the years, he acquired a network of loyal colleagues, but by moving to Moscow Kirov 
would lose some of his independence and would be directly subordinate to Kaganovich and 
Molotov who were higher in the hierarchy.
341
 In that respect, it may seem that Stalin decided 
to transfer Kirov because he was threatened by his independent position. Stalin initiated 
Kirov‟s transfer in order to weaken his authority in the Party and obtain better control over 
him in Moscow. Stalin was careful not to allow any of his subordinates become too 
powerful.
342
 Rosliakov implied in his account that Stalin‟s motives to transfer Kirov were 
dictated by his fear of Kirov‟s strong position in Leningrad.343 A similar interpretation was 
adopted by Orlov who stated that, “due to being annoyed by Kirov‟s independence, Stalin 
decided to remove him from Leningrad.”344 Nonetheless, the significance of the confrontation 
seems to have been exaggerated over time. The conflict between Kirov and Stalin seemed to 
be a typical bureaucratic confrontation and did not reflect a policy disagreement. Stalin‟s 
motives to replace Kirov could be explained by his desire to counterbalance Kaganovich‟s 
influence, which is something he in fact did in 1935 and 1936.
345
  
Furthermore, it may be considered that Stalin needed a loyal administrator in his Secretariat 
that would assist him. Stalin was anxious to ensure that people of proper calibre were retained 
in the central party organs, to ensure that their authority was not diminished.
346
 Therefore, 
Kirov‟s reassignment may be interpreted in terms of promotion. Stalin trusted Kirov and 
therefore needed him in his closest circle. Rightfully noticed by Getty, if Stalin and Kirov 
were antagonists, it would be difficult to explain Kirov‟s continued rise.347 The positions 
within the Secretariat, Politburo and Orgburo would give Kirov more space to challenge 
Stalin politically. The Politburo was an important policy-making body. The Orgburo 
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concerned itself with the appointment of leading officials. It led internal party campaigns such 
as the exchange and checking of party documents, monitored the party membership, and 
ensured central control over local party bodies.
348
 The Secretariat played a vital role within 
the system of administration. It issued instructions on policy implementation and monitored 
policy performance.
349
 Therefore, if Kirov was to represent an independent platform his new 
position would give him legitimate ways of establishment of his “moderate” programme. 
However, as noted earlier, Kirov was unwilling to transfer to Moscow.  From the agenda of 
the Orgburo and the Secretariat kept in the RGASPI archive, it is evident that Kirov was often 
absent from the majority of the meetings throughout 1934. Therefore, Kirov did not perform 
his duties of the Central Committee Secretary. Kirov‟s obvious reluctance to participate in the 
central political matters suggests the idea that he did not have ambitions to advance any 
alternative line of policy development. 
KIROV AND STALIN IN THE 1930S 
The personal relationship between Kirov and Stalin may also substantiate the view that Stalin 
wanted Kirov closer to him in Moscow due to personal reasons. Analysis of the existing 
documents has not suggested Stalin‟s irritation with Kirov. On the contrary, recollections of 
people close to Stalin, as well as correspondence between Stalin, Kirov and Ordzhonikidze, 
imply a very close and affectionate relationship between Kirov and Stalin. They holidayed 
together during summer, there was regular connection between Moscow and Leningrad, and 
Kirov was welcomed by Stalin‟s family. Stalin‟s daughter Svetlana Allilueva portrayed Kirov 
in her memoirs as a close friend of the Stalin family: 
Kirov was a close friend of our family already since the Caucasus time. He was well acquainted with 
grandfather‟s family and was very fond of my mother… Kirov stayed at our house, he was a friend, an 
old comrade. Father was very fond of him, he was very attached to him. …Kirov was closest to father, 
closer than Svanidze or any other relatives or colleague.
350
  
In his interviews with Chuev, Molotov even described Kirov as Stalin‟s favourite.351 Stalin‟s 
bodyguards, Vlasik and Rybin, also witnessed an affectionate relationship between the two.
352
  
Besides Vlasik, Kirov was the only one who was permitted to bathe with Stalin in the Russian 
sauna, bania.  
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Kirov and Stalin became even closer in 1932 after Stalin‟s young wife, Nadezhda Allilueva, 
committed suicide. According to the recollections of Maria Svanidze, a relative from Stalin‟s 
first marriage, Stalin himself used to say that Kirov took care of him like a baby when his 
wife died: “After Nadia‟s death he [Kirov] was the closest person, who managed to find a 
way to Joseph, who gave him missing warmth and comfort.” 353  Kirov‟s visits to Stalin 
became more frequent after Allilueva‟s death. Prior to Allilueva‟s death, Kirov used to stay at 
Ordzhonikidze‟s flat. However, according to the memoirs of Ordzhonikidze‟s wife and 
Kirov‟s wife, since Allilueva‟s death in the late autumn of 1932, Kirov almost always stayed 
at Stalin‟s flat whenever he was in Moscow.354 As noted by Egge, the Yakovlev investigation 
committee, which was set up to investigate Kirov‟s death in 1989, also concluded that the 
personal relationship between Kirov and Stalin was quite close in the early 1930s.
355
 On the 
basis of the recollection and memoirs of people close to Stalin, it may be concluded that their 
personal relationship was rather warm and affectionate. Kirov was not like any other member 
of the Party; he could even be called Stalin‟s favourite. 
It is, however, unfortunate that there is no assessment of the Kirov-Stalin relationship by 
people close to Kirov. Despite most of the documents revealing a good personal relationship 
between Kirov and Stalin, it does not necessarily mean that they could not disagree 
politically. Moreover, it should be taken into consideration that there is a profound amount of 
letters between Kirov and Stalin missing from the archive, and that the assessment of the 
personal relationship was mainly done on the basis of Stalin‟s companions. However, as has 
been demonstrated, most of the conflicts between Kirov and Stalin were connected with 
regional Leningrad business and did not seem to challenge general policies. Traditionalists 
did not ignore the good relationship between Stalin and Kirov, but used it as evidence of 
Stalin‟s duplicity. The personal relationship between Stalin and Kirov implies one that is very 
close and affectionate relationship. Stalin seemed to trust Kirov and it may be assumed that, 
on the basis of their close relationship, Stalin required Kirov‟s presence closer in Moscow. 
CONCLUSION 
In the existing archival documentation there is no inclination towards an existence of two 
opposed factions based on moderate and radical visions. There is neither confirmation of 
Kirov‟s alternative position within the party. An analysis of Kirov‟s statements, in 
combination with a discussion of his administration in his region, has led to conclusions that 
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Kirov primarily followed central resolutions and did not represent any distinguishingly 
different views from Stalin. In 1933, Kirov seemed to support relaxation that was already 
underway. It has been shown that relaxation of policies in 1933 represented a reaction to 
domestic circumstances in combination with international factors, rather than Kirov‟s 
personal influence. In his demands to the central government, he acted like many other 
regional bosses conditioned by local pressures, such as famine for example. Although several 
regional secretaries requested lowering the grain procurement plans, they did not seem to act 
as a united opposition. Moreover, analysis has shown that Stalin himself seemed to play a 
central role in the transformations of the early 1930s towards “moderation”.    
Kirov did not seem to occupy a significantly different position in his treatment of 
oppositionists. There is no record of a conflict between Kirov and Stalin about the fate of 
Riutin, which has often been used in the theory of Kirov‟s opposition to Stalin. There is also 
no documentation of Kirov‟s allegedly moderate treatment of oppositionists. Kirov‟s public 
speeches did not reflect a moderate attitude towards the opposition. On the contrary, the 
results of the OGPU arrests in the Leningrad region showed that repression methods in 
Leningrad were equally employed like in other regions of the Soviet Union.  An analysis of 
the events during the Seventeenth Party Congress has not suggested any trace of the existence 
of an anti-Stalin coalition, as such. There were some conflicts between some of the delegates 
of the Party Congress based on the disagreements over production targets for the Second Five 
Year Plan. However, this conflict seemed to be limited to the Congress itself and did not 
pursue in the following months. Moreover, Kirov seemed to be rather reserved in his position 
towards the pace of the second Five Year Plan, as well as not showing any interest in the 
central matters at the Politburo meetings. Analysis has shown that he was not among the main 
reporters and he was generally quiet regarding the speeches of others. Furthermore, Kirov did 
not seem to approve of his transfer to Moscow. Kirov seemed to enjoy his position as a leader 
of Leningrad rather than a leader of the opposition. In the early 1930s, Kirov revealed himself 
as one of the closest associates with Stalin. He loyally followed Stalin‟s resolutions regarding 
Soviet policies; his statements were in some ways a reflection of Stalin‟s. Furthermore, like 
many other faithful Stalinists, Kirov equally contributed to the formation of Stalin‟s cult of 
personality in his speeches. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
SERGEI KIROV: A FIRM ASSOCIATE OF STALIN? 
From the full study of Sergei Kirov‟s political career on the basis of archival documentation, 
there is generally little indication of any profound signs of Kirov‟s alleged ambivalence to the 
general line of the Soviet Communist Party in the late 1920s and the early 1930s. On the basis 
of this research no document in the RGASPI has been found that may directly prove or refute 
a theory that Kirov advocated a set of reforms different from those of Stalin. Nevertheless, a 
broad spectre of archival sources has contributed to the establishment of a general impression 
of Kirov as a politician, his role in the Leningrad regional politics as well as the Soviet 
politics, and his relationship with Stalin and other leading members of the Soviet Communist 
Party.  
The analysis of Kirov‟s speeches has revealed that his official statements seemed to change 
by and large with transformations in the top level of the Party. Compared with Stalin‟s official 
statements and utterances of other prominent Stalinists, Kirov‟s speeches generally reflect 
central resolutions of the Party‟s leadership. In his speeches, Kirov appears as an ardent 
Communist, a responsible politician who faithfully followed the Party‟s resolutions, first 
under the leadership of Lenin and later Stalin. Although Kirov seemed to be uncertain of his 
political preferences before the October Revolution, he seemed to follow the Party‟s 
resolutions dutifully after the Revolution. He devotedly advanced Lenin‟s NEP when it was 
centrally proclaimed in 1921. However, Kirov also joined the criticism of the NEP when the 
Party majority under the leadership of Stalin started criticising it. 
After his appointment as the leader of the Leningrad Party organisation, Kirov‟s political 
position seemed to change in line with Stalin‟s. Moreover, Kirov‟s official statements in 
general mirrored Stalin‟s public utterances. Those utterances that earlier were interpreted by 
selected scholars in terms of Kirov‟s “moderate” position within the Party, considered against 
the general political context, appeared to be in line with general developments within the 
Party‟s elite. In cases where some deviation from the general line was found, it occurred to be 
in line with Stalin‟s. In fact, Stalin himself seemed to change between “moderate” and 
“radical” positions. For example, Kirov‟s vacillation in line with Stalin‟s is seen in Kirov‟s 
warning about excesses in the collectivisation in the early 1930s. In the earlier research, such 
statements were interpreted in terms of Kirov‟s support of relaxation of administrative 
pressure, however it was most likely meant as a response to Stalin‟s “Dizzy with success” 
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speech, in which Stalin blamed regional bosses for excessive results of collectivisation in the 
countryside.  
It should be taken into consideration, however, that speeches of the Bolsheviks were 
thoroughly prepared beforehand and edited later. Like other Communists, as a responsible 
party member and a leader of the Leningrad organisation, Kirov also used his speeches as a 
way to promote the central resolutions of the Communist Party. Kirov‟s speeches alone 
should not be considered as the only proof of his loyalty to Stalin and the Party. Even at the 
regional party meetings, that were supposedly less heavily censored, Kirov revealed himself 
as a typical member of the Stalin elite. There was no sign of opposition to Stalin in Kirov‟s 
personal corrections of the speeches either. It was in general difficult to find any so-called 
ideological slips in Kirov‟s statements. There is no sign of deviation from the Party‟s 
discourse in his official statements.  
Kirov showed however certain restraint towards public criticism of the Right Deviation led by 
Stalin‟s opponents, Bukharin, Tomsky and Rykov in the late 1920s. On the one hand, such a 
reserved position towards the leaders of the Right Deviation could be interpreted in terms of 
Kirov‟s sympathies towards the Rightist ideology. However, Kirov‟s position in the early 
campaign against the Rightists can be explained by a generally uncertain political situation. 
Conditioned by earlier disagreements within the leadership, the Soviet administration tried to 
conceal existing differences within its nucleus. Both of the factions officially denied each 
others‟ existence. Moreover, other prominent Soviet leaders, not only Kirov, seemed to be 
unsure about the campaign against the Right leaders. The question did not seem to be about 
opposing Stalin, but about how to avoid further conflicts within the party. Therefore, even 
Kirov‟s “moderate” position towards the Rightists that was interpreted in terms of Kirov‟s 
liberalism towards oppositionists, occurred to be in line with the reaction of many other 
prominent Communists. When the conflict with the Rightists became more open to the public, 
Kirov‟s criticism of the Rightist ideology was more in line with other Stalinists. Moreover, 
from the study of Kirov‟s political profile, he generally appears as a very cautious politician. 
He tried to avoid conflicts and intrigues at the top level of the Communist Party and seemed 
to adapt to the decisions from the top of the Soviet leadership.  
Despite the reserved position towards the Rightists, Kirov did not in fact treat oppositionists 
in any way different from Stalin. His public speeches do not reflect a “moderate” attitude 
towards different members of various oppositional groups. Although Kirov did not wish to 
move to Leningrad in the middle of the conflict between Stalin and the leaders of the Left 
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Opposition, he vigorously fought against the Left Opposition in Leningrad when transferred 
there. Moreover, in the archive there is no record of a conflict between Stalin and Kirov over 
the fate of an oppositionist, Martemian Riutin, which is often placed in the centre of 
arguments of Kirov‟s opposition to Stalin and his allegedly tolerant relation towards Stalin‟s 
opponents. In fact there is no trace that such a question was raised at all at any Politburo 
meetings. Such conclusions are in line with the evaluation of Khlevniuk, who considered the 
conflict between Stalin and Kirov to be a mystification.
356
 Stalin seemed to act carefully in the 
early 1930s regarding the treatment of the opposition. Even if Kirov showed some tolerance 
towards the opposition, it was generally in line with Stalin‟s official position. For instance, 
Stalin favoured reconciliation with former leaders of different oppositional groups in 1933, at 
least officially. It is for this reason that Zinoviev and Kamenev were returned to the ranks of 
the Communist Party and not on Kirov‟s personal initiative as it has been suggested by some 
scholars earlier. Moreover, in some of the statements, Kirov was even more critical than 
Stalin. For instance, Kirov questioned the sincerity of oppositionists‟ acknowledgement of 
their “mistakes” at the Seventeenth Party Congress. 
Administrative pressure in the Leningrad region, which was under the authority of Kirov, was 
no less severe, perhaps even more severe taking into consideration the statistical data of secret 
police arrests. Despite some reported cases of humane treatment of prisoners who worked at 
the construction of the Baltic-White Sea Canal, Kirov was proud of the work done under the 
harsh administration of the secret police. Kirov seemed to be acquainted with the fact that the 
canal was constructed using prison camp labour at great human cost, but nevertheless 
supported it.  
On the basis of the existing documentation there is no sign of oppositional tendencies in the 
administration of the Leningrad region. It is evident that, in comparison with other regions, 
collectivisation of the Leningrad region proceeded relatively slower. However, it has been 
demonstrated that there are other factors that may explain the delay in collectivisation in 
Leningrad, rather than Kirov‟s oppositional standing to Stalin. There were local geographical 
conditions that complicated collectivisation in the region. Kirov revealed himself as a faithful 
supporter of Stalin and Stalin‟s policies from above throughout his work as the Leningrad 
Party Secretary. He conducted himself as an influential administrator of one of the country‟s 
major party organisations, rather than a contender for power. For example, he was rarely 
present at the Politburo meetings in Moscow. Since the Politburo played a significant role in 
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the party‟s policy-making procedures Kirov should have participated more often in order to 
advance his ideas and proposals, if indeed he had any. On the contrary, however, even when 
Kirov was present, he was not among the central speakers and seemed to be rather reserved 
during the party debates.  
The examination of the personal relationship between Kirov and Stalin demonstrated that the 
two were not only close associates, but also very close friends. Kirov was among Stalin‟s 
favourites. They were often holidaying together, Kirov stayed at Stalin‟s flat whenever he was 
in Moscow and they shared daily conversations over the phone. A close personal relationship 
however should not be used solely as the only base for interpretation of the question of 
whether Kirov and Stalin were political antagonists. The archival documentation has revealed 
some conflicts between Kirov and Stalin in the early 1930s. However, as rightfully noticed by 
Khlevniuk, those conflicts seemed to be limited to the common disagreements between the 
centre and provinces, rather than ideological conflicts between the two leaders.
357
  
As a matter of fact, Kirov was obliged with his career in the Soviet Communist Party to Stalin 
personally. On the personal initiative of Stalin Kirov was chosen to substitute Grigory 
Zinoviev on the post of the Secretary of the Leningrad Party Committee, which together with 
the Moscow Party organisation presented an important party committee in the Soviet Union. 
Kirov‟s appointment in Leningrad, therefore, demonstrated that Stalin entrusted Kirov with 
important tasks. Also, on Stalin‟s personal initiative, Kirov was elected to the Politburo and 
the Party‟s Secretariat in the early 1930s. Although it has often been claimed that Kirov‟s 
planned reassignment to Moscow, also on Stalin‟s initiative, signified Stalin‟s awareness of 
Kirov‟s oppositional role, Kirov‟s transfer to Moscow could also be interpreted in terms of 
promotion within the Party hierarchy. Therefore, Kirov‟s continued rise within the Soviet 
Party, partially due to Stalin‟s assistance, may prove that Stalin and Kirov were not 
antagonists, but rather allies. Moreover, Kirov was politically compromised due to his pre-
revolutionary experiences, such as writing for a “bourgeois” newspaper. The Soviet Party, 
including Stalin, were aware of Kirov‟s “liberal” past. For instance, after articles in the central 
newspapers appeared in 1929, Kirov‟s pre-revolutionary experiences were characterised by 
the party as “incorrect”. It seemed that due to Stalin‟s personal support on the matter, Kirov 
avoided further discussions in the Party about the nature of his Bolshevism. Taking into 
consideration the Party history, opposition to Stalin‟s policies and the general line could have 
caused doubts about loyalty to the Party as such. Kirov was an experienced politician and he 
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was aware of the party tradition regarding factionalism. Due to the Party‟s awareness of 
Kirov‟s questionable past, Stalin had a hold on him. As a result, Kirov was dependent on 
Stalin and consequently it would have been difficult for him to advance policies alternative to 
Stalin‟s.358  
Kirov did not reveal himself as the initiator of the relaxation of policies beginning in 1933. It 
has been suggested that relaxation could be caused by domestic economic crisis, which was 
accompanied by a terrible famine in most of the Soviet Union, together with the new 
international circumstances, rather than the initiative of Kirov. Although, the study of the 
archival documentation has revealed requests to Stalin from regional bosses, including Kirov, 
aimed at the reduction of procurement targets. However, they did not seem to act as a united 
front of opposition, but rather as individual leaders who were standing up for interests of their 
respective provinces. Kirov did not seem to act as a representative of a united group of 
moderate minded party members, but rather as a responsible leader of the Leningrad region. 
Moreover, Stalin himself seemed to admit the necessity of a certain retreat from the 
administrative pressure in order to ease the critical situation in the countryside. It has been 
rightfully noted by such scholars as Khlevniuk, Getty and Egge that Kirov supported a 
“moderate” line that was already established in the Soviet Union.  
Nevertheless, although Kirov did not lead the coherent resistance to Stalin and did not have 
ambitions to substitute Stalin as the General Secretary, it does not however mean that Stalin 
was not annoyed by his rising popularity. The documentation reveals that Kirov in fact was 
well-liked by within the Soviet leadership and the masses. Kirov could have been perceived 
by his fellow Party comrades as an alternative to Stalin due to his loyal position towards the 
general line of the Party throughout his political career.  
The study of Kirov‟s political career on the basis of available archival documentation has not 
confirmed a theory that Kirov represented any reformist tendencies and, given his ideological 
views as well as his views on running political questions, no reason why he should have had 
one. On the contrary Kirov was one of the most faithful supporters of Stalin and his policies, 
Stalin‟s golden boy.  
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